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# FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

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COMPILED IN THE  
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH  
DIVISION OF THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF  
ARMY HEAD QUARTERS  
INDIA

VOL. I.—SUPPLEMENT A

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMADS  
(INCLUDING OPERATIONS IN THE KHAIBER, 1ST—7TH MAY)

1908

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## PREFACE.

THIS account of the Operations in the Mohmand country and in the Khaibar during April and May 1908 has been compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff by Lieutenant R. Dane, 21st Cavalry, Frontier Force.

Chapter I contains a brief description of the Mohmand country, while in Chapter II will be found a summary of events bringing up to date the history of our relations with the tribe as given in Volume I of this series.

Detailed reports on the working of the following branches and departments of the Force during the operations have also been prepared, and are available for reference at Army Headquarters :—

Ammunition Column.	Supply.
Artillery.	Survey.
Engineering.	Telegraphs.
Medical.	Telephone Section.
Postal.	Transport.
Signalling.	Veterinary.

Of the above the Signalling Report, and extracts from the Engineering and Medical Reports, have been reprinted and will be found among the Appendices to this work.

W. MALLESON, *Colonel,*  
*Assistant Quartermaster-General,*  
*Intelligence Branch.*

SIMLA ;  
23rd December 1909.




## MAP to ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS AGAINST the MOHMANDS 1908



## MAP

To illustrate Report on Visual Signalling Stations used in the Khaibar, and by the Mohmand Field Force, May 1908.



I. B. Topo. Dy. No. 8,114.  
Exd. C. J. A. May 1909.

Scale 1 inch—4 miles

No. 4,872-I, 1909.

## REFERENCE.

Visual signalling lines used \_\_\_\_\_  
 do. do. do. considered possible - - -  
 Station calls indicated by 2 or 3 letters e. g.  
 Z. A. (Zintara); M. K. D. (Malakand).  
 Single letters A. B. J. etc., refer to Report.

# OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS,

1908.

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## CHAPTER I.

### *DESCRIPTION OF THE MOHMANDS AND THEIR COUNTRY.*

AT the present day the Mohmands are primarily divided into two main branches, *viz.*—The Independent Mohmands, who live across the Administrative border; and those dwelling in and around Matanni and in the south-western corner of the Peshawar district. Mohmands of the Peshawar district have, however, long lost touch with those of the hills, and were in no way connected with the outbreak in the spring of 1908.

The trans-border Mohmands may be considered as being subdivided into the following eight clans:—Baezai, Khwaizai, Tarakzai, Halimzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai, Isa Khel and Burhan Khel.\* Of these the last six, known as the assured clans—together with the Musa Khel section of the Baezai—are in receipt of allowances from the British Government, granted in lieu of those which, prior to the Durand agreement, certain of them had received from the Amirs of Kabul.

The Baezai and Khwaizai clans receive no British allowances, and consider themselves subject to Afghan authority alone. They reside largely on the Afghan side of the Durand line, which has, however, never yet been demarcated in Mohmand territory and is still a subject of dispute.

The total fighting strength of the Mohmands was estimated in 1907 at 21,500 men with about 1,850 breech-loading rifles. Of the above about 11,000 men and 750 rifles belong to the Afghan clans.

Since then many more breech-loaders are known to have passed into the country,—a result of the successful smuggling of firearms from Masqat in the Persian Gulf into Baluchistan, and thence to

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\* Strictly speaking the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel are branches of the Tarakzai clan, but they have long since broken away from the latter and now form distinct clans by themselves.

Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier. Naturally, however, this estimate gives us no true idea of what strength the Mohmands could actually put in the field. This can best be calculated from the numbers opposed to us in the actions at Matta and Shabkadar on the 24th April 1908, which were approximately as follows :—

	Men.
Musa Khel Baezai . . . . .	1,000
Koda Khel Baezai . . . . .	120
Other Baezai . . . . .	5,000
Khwaizai . . . . .	300
Kamali Halimzai . . . . .	500
Dawezai . . . . .	400
Utmanzai . . . . .	300
Other Mohmands . . . . .	1,000
<hr/>	
TOTAL . .	8,620
<hr/>	

In addition to these the Mohmand *lashkar* was swelled by—

	Men.
Utman Khel of Ambahar . . . . .	1,000
Ningraharis . . . . .	3,000
Kandahari Safis . . . . .	2,000
Men from Kunar . . . . .	3,000
<hr/>	
TOTAL . .	9,000
<hr/>	

Mohmand country proper—*i.e.*, omitting the affiliated clans of Shilmanis and Mullagoris, who live on the right bank of the Kabul river, and whose interests are entirely distinct from those of other Mohmands—is bounded, roughly, on the north by the Ambahar valley and Utman Khel country, on the east by the Swat river and Utman Khel country, on the south-east by the administrative border of the Peshawar district, and on the south by the Kabul river; to the west it extends up to about the longitude of the Kunar river in Afghanistan, and there are also some large Mohmand villages south of the Kabul river in Ningrahar.

The country (on our side of the Durand line) thus enclosed is, with a few exceptions, exceedingly wild, rugged and desolate. The hills almost throughout are practically waterless, except, of course, during the autumn and winter rains, and the inhabitants depend

largely for their water-supply on artificial tanks, which catch and store rainwater and surface drainage. That the soil is fertile, however, and only needs a sufficient rainfall to produce excellent crops, is evident from the fact that the expeditionary force of 1908 found large areas covered with standing wheat and barley.

The principal valley in the country is the Bohai Dag, known in its lower portion as the Danish Kol. This valley runs roughly east and west right across the Mohmand country, from the Silala Sar to the Swat river, which it joins about 13 miles above Abazai, and has a total length of 40 miles and an elevation varying from 3,000 to 1,500 feet. The upper part of the valley is broad and open, but for the last ten miles of its course the hills close in, and the valley becomes a narrow rocky gorge.

No water was found in the bed of the *nala* much above Mulla Kalai, about 6 miles from its junction with the Swat, either in the expedition of 1897 or in 1908. In its upper portion the Bohai Dag is inhabited by the Baezai and Khwaizai clans, lower down by the Halimzai and Isa Khel.

About 7 miles above its junction with the Swat river, the Bohai Dag, or Danish Kol as it is here called, is joined by the Yakh Dand Nala. This valley rises to the north of the Bedmanai Pass under the name of the Mitai Nala, and flows south and then east to join the Danish Kol. No water was found flowing above this junction either in the expedition of 1897 or that of 1908. At its head it is inhabited by the Musa Khel section of the Baezai, and near its junction with the Danish Kol by the Halimzai and Utmanzai, while between the two, in a very open portion of the valley, dwell the vassal clan of Safis.

Bordering the territories of the Kandahari Safis on the north-east and the Utmanzai on the north, lie the Sarlara hills. At the foot of the northern slopes of this range flows the Pipal Nala—almost due west to east. In the upper portion of this valley live the Gurbaz Safis, and lower down the Dawezai.

Running water appears in the large watercourse of the Pipal a short distance above its junction with the Ambahar stream, which meets it flowing roughly north to south.

The valley of the Ambahar bounds Mohmand country on the east to its junction with the Danish Kol, shortly before that stream

itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Mohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908.

Midway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the *nala*-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet.

Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water.

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## CHAPTER II.

### *DEALINGS WITH MOHMANDS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXPEDITION OF 1897.*

FOR some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance.

In that year, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This had naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel *maliks* now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac-

Grant of an allowance to the Musa Khel Baezai of the Mitai valley. cede to their request. At the same time the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to

relinquish his claim of suzerainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Nawagai Khanate.

This event was quickly seized upon by the *mallas*, most prominent of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Mohmands.

All who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings

Fanatical preaching by *mallas*, against those in receipt of allowances. with, the British were denounced as 'Kafirs'; and the preaching of these men

had such effect on the Mitai Musa Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted.

Their example was followed by the Dawezai, Utmanzai, and Pandiali Mohmands, and of all the 'assured clans' the Halimzai and Tarakzai alone dared to come regularly to Peshawar to receive their allowances.

About this time also further ill-feeling was occasioned by the preparations for the construction of a railway through Shilman.

Signs of unrest caused by the construction of a railway through Shilman. The Baezai and Khwaizai especially began to show their hostility to the scheme, and threatened the villages of Smatzai

and Shinpokh on the right bank of the river, because they remained friendly to the British and were willing to assist in the work.

In April 1903, a party of Afghan Mohmands, many of whom were First outrage on Smatzai. *khasadars*, actually crossed the river, filled up some wells in the villages and succeeded in impeding irrigation, thereby doing much damage to the crops.

The majority of the raiders appear to have been Morcha Khel Baezai.

The Indian Government at once represented to the Amir the necessity for the demarcation of the frontier in this region, in order

Proposals for a Boundary Commission accepted by the Amir. to put an end to outrages of this kind. A Boundary Commission was asked for and

to this the Amir gave his consent. Accordingly a British Commissioner was nominated, Major Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Political Agent in the Khaibar, being the officer selected, and on the 19th December 1903, the Amir was informed of the appointment and was further told that Major Roos-Keppel would be ready to meet the Afghan Commissioner at the Nawa Kotal on the 1st February.

Meanwhile the Amir expressed a wish for the delimitation of the entire stretch of frontier from the Nawa Kotal to Paiwar Kotal. He also showed that he intended to put forward again his father's claim to the whole of the Bohai Dag, without making any corresponding concessions in the Kabul river region.

It soon became evident, however, from his continued failure to appoint a Commissioner, and from the way in which he persistently delayed matters by verbal quibbles, that what he really desired was the indefinite postponement of any demarcation whatever.

Accordingly as, by the 1st April 1904, he had nominated Postponement of the Commission. no Afghan official to meet Major Roos-Keppel, who had now been waiting for

two whole months with all necessary transport in readiness, he was informed that owing to the lateness of the season the matter would have to be deferred till the following autumn.

Till May 1905 nothing further happened, but in that month a second outrage was committed at Smatzai.

**Second incident at Smatzai.** The Sarhang of Dakka, Muhammad Husain Khan, demanded the return of some wood which had floated down to Smatzai from the boat-bridge at Lalpura, recently broken in a flood. The villagers refused, saying that without an order from the Political Agent in the Khaibar they would not give up what they considered theirs by ancient custom. Thereupon the Sarhang, incensed at the obstinacy of the villagers, decided to seize the wood by a display of force sufficient in his estimation to overawe the villagers, though without apparently desiring that any armed collision should occur. With this object in view he despatched 120 *khasadars* from Kam Dakka to Smatzai, followed by 180 more from Lalpura.

A third and smaller party of *khasadars*, mostly Morcha Khel Baezai, though ostensibly acting against the Sarhang's orders, crossed the river on rafts and made a sudden and unexpected attack on the village, opening fire at close range. During the diversion thus caused the larger party of *khasadars* floated off the wood.

On receipt of news of this incident the Indian Government protested to the Amir against the conduct of Muhammad Husain Khan, the Viceroy suggesting that this disturber of the peace should be removed from his post of Sarhang of Dakka.

The Amir emphatically declined to call the Sarhang to account, and even forwarded and endorsed a decidedly impudent letter from Muhammad Husain Khan laying claim to Smatzai as Afghan territory.

The Indian Government then sent a further communication, in which it was pointed out that the demarcation of the boundary in that part of the frontier was a matter of urgent necessity, and that

**Renewed proposals for a Boundary Commission.** consequently the Indian Government were prepared to arrange for a Boundary Commission to take place in the autumn. At the same time the Amir was informed that his claim to Smatzai could not possibly be entertained. Nothing, however, came of this renewed proposal.

Throughout this period of unrest the Tarakzai clan remained steadfastly loyal to Government, and even made it clear that they were quite prepared to defend the Shilman railway throughout its length within their own clan boundaries.

Accordingly, in December 1905, an agreement was entered into

Grant of an additional allowance to the Tarakzai for the protection of the railway, etc. with them, by which, in consideration of an additional allowance of Rs. 5,000 per annum, the tribe undertook full responsibility for the protection of the railway and all works concerned, also of the river itself if used for transport, etc., from Warsak up to the extreme limit of Tarakzai territory.

The Halimzai agreed to assist the Tarakzai in performing this duty and also undertook the same responsibility as the Tarakzai, with regard to any portion of the railway which might at any future date be carried through their limits.

In spite, however, of the attitude of the Tarakzai and Halimzai,

Commencement of a series of raids into the Shabkadar district. disaffection continued to increase, and the Utman Khel of Ambahar were also infected. In 1906 a series of raids into the Peshawar district about Shabkadar commenced, the moving spirits being the Koda Khel Baezai, under Mahasil, and the Ambahar Utman Khel under Mir Baz, of Gumbatai, and Hakim Khan.

The first serious violation of British territory took place on the 21st March 1906, when a gang consisting mainly of Afghan Mohmands, assisted by outlaws from Hazarnao in Ningrahar, raided the village of

Raid on Jogini, 21st March 1906. Jogini, near Michni. In this raid some Tarakzai were also implicated, but the *maliks* of the clan acted fully up to their responsibility and handed over the offenders to the civil authorities in Peshawar for trial. A second and more serious raid occurred on the 9th April. The village of Tangi, near Abazai, was

Raid on Tangi, 9th April 1906. attacked, four British subjects killed, the chief constable wounded and property valued at Rs. 30,000 carried off by the gang, which appears on this occasion to have been composed mainly of Koda Khel Baezai and Ambahar Utman Khel.

The success of these raids caused a considerable panic amongst the large Hindu population of Shankargarh and its neighbourhood

and a rumour gained currency among them that a hostile *lashkar* was gathering across the border.

To allay their anxiety, and to prevent any further violation of Despatch of cavalry to Shan- British territory, a Squadron Guides Caval- kargah and Abazai. ry and a Squadron 21st Cavalry F. F. were sent to the Forts at Abazai and Shankargarh, respectively.

The cavalry on their arrival soon discovered that the Tangi affair had been nothing more than an ordinary frontier raid, and that there was no truth in the rumour of a hostile gathering. Accordingly, as there seemed to be no necessity to keep the cavalry there, they were withdrawn, but from that time it has been considered advisable to garrison Shankargarh and Abazai with small detachments of regular troops.

The result of these measures was that throughout the remainder of 1906 and the whole of 1907, only one small raid on the village of Hasanzai near Shabkadar was committed.

Stopped in one direction, the Mohmands still found it possible to give vent to their hostile feelings in the Kabul river region. In

Captain Lubbock, R.E., fired on on the Kabul river, January 1907 Captain Lubbock, R.E., in charge of the construction of the Shilman railway, was fired upon while moving down

the river in a boat. Later, in November of the same year, on the arrival near Smatzai of a survey party to decide on the merits of the two alternative routes for the railway, through

Third Smatzai incident. Loe Shilman valley or along the Kabul river to Smatzai, a party of some 200 Koda Khel Baezai and Khwaizai collected on the left bank of the river.

The camp of Mr. Johns, conducting the survey, was fired on at Bar Ugda, and the villages of Smatzai and Shinpokh were subjected to constant sniping from the left bank of the river. This small *lashkar* took up a *sangared* position along the left bank, as far down as Palosi, thus effectually preventing any detailed examination of the right bank in that direction. Mr. Johns succeeded, however, in effecting all that he considered necessary, and on the 1st December the party withdrew.

On their departure the *lashkar* returned to their homes. During the period in which they had been in position on the bank of the

river these Mohmands had been supplied with provisions by the Hakim of Lalpura, who for a long time past had been very hostile to the British. The new Sarhang of Dakka, however, acting contrary to the procedure of his father Muhammad Husain Khan, who had died in February 1907, seems to have been averse to the whole affair.

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### CHAPTER III.

#### *BEHAVIOUR OF THE MOHMANDS DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION.*

IN 1906 and 1907 many raids were made into the Peshawar and Kohat districts by the Zakka Khel Afridis. During the first few weeks of 1908, the situation became so serious that Government sanctioned a punitive expedition into the Bazar valley—the principal winter home of the Zakka Khel.

Expedition against Zakka Khel. On the advance of this force into Bazar in February, several fanatical *mullas* attempted to raise help for the Zakka Khel, and signs of unrest were apparent among most of the tribes living north of the Kabul river, more especially amongst the Mohmands, the majority of whom were already in a state of discontent through the construction of the Shilman railway.

When some emissaries from the Zakka Khel actually made their appearance in the Mohmand country they found many of the young

Gathering of a Mohmand *lashkar*. bloods willing to assist them, and a small *lashkar* quickly collected under the fanatical Gud Mulla of Inzari. By this time, however, the resistance of the Zakka Khel was weakening, and before the Mohmand *lashkar* had decided whether to move into Bazar itself, or create a diversion by an attack on Shankargarh, the Zakka Khel accepted the terms imposed on them.

There was, therefore, no further opportunity for the Mohmands to effect anything on their behalf and the majority of the *lashkar*

Dispersal of *lashkar* on close return to their homes, having accomplished nothing but a paltry raid on the village of Batagram near Shankargarh, on the 3rd March.

Immediately on receipt of news of this rising amongst the Mohmands, in which the strength of the *lashkar* was much exaggerated,

Despatch of cavalry to the two Squadrons 21st Cavalry were ordered Mohmand border. to proceed from Nowshera Cavalry Cantonment to the Mohmand border. They reached Shabkadar on the 4th March, a few days before the dispersal of the *lashkar*, but as,

shortly after their arrival, the crisis seemed to have passed away they were soon withdrawn.

In reality, however, trouble was by no means at an end. When the majority of the gathering had gone to their homes, a few wild spirits, disappointed of fighting and unwilling to return to their villages without having accomplished anything, had hung together under the leadership of Mahasil, Mir Baz and Hakim Khan. This gang took the departure of the cavalry as the signal for the commencement of a series of raids into the Doaba, *i.e.*, the tract of land lying between the Swat and Kabul rivers.

Three times in quick succession they plundered the Hindu shops of villages near Shabkadar. The first violation of British territory

Raids by Mohmands in spring of 1908. occurred on the 24th March, when Marozai, a village six miles north-east of Shangargarh, was attacked, two Hindus killed and a large quantity of property carried off.

One day later the village of Mirzadher, two miles from Marozai, suffered the same fate, and this time a *bania* was carried off. This dacoity was not, however, an unqualified success, for on their return journey the gang were unexpectedly attacked by an Isa Khel Malik, Ghulam Khan of Dag, who has always been friendly to Government. A fight ensued in which the raiders were worsted and had to make a hurried retreat, leaving one of their number, a Koda Khel, and the Hindu in the hands of Ghulam Khan, who sent them in to the Deputy Commissioner a few days later under an escort. This check did not stop the raiding, however, for on the 30th March, less than a week later, the gang carried out their third serious outrage. The Hindu shops in Chikkar, a village nine miles south-east of Shabkadar, were robbed, and the raiders made good their escape with the booty.

These rapid and successful movements naturally caused a panic amongst the Hindus of the district, who were invariably selected as the victims.

Accordingly the regular garrisons of the posts at Shabkadar and Abazai were strengthened, with a view Increase of troops on the border. to setting free the Border Military Police for patrolling. By the 1st April the

troops on the border had been reinforced and were disposed as follows :—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Shabkadar . . . .	30	150
Matta Mughal Khel . . . .	120	150
Abazai . . . .	30	150

The police were also strengthened by the despatch of 100 Border Military Police and 40 District Police from Peshawar, and the command of the entire force, which was further reinforced on the 4th by 80 Scouts Royal Warwickshire Regiment, was given to Lieutenant-Colonel V. B. Fane, 21st Cavalry F. F.

When the increase of troops became known to the tribesmen across the border an expedition seemed to them the object in view. The Koda Khel and Ambahar Utman Khel, who had furnished the majority of the raiders, at once sounded their neighbours for help should a British force enter their territories. Mahasil, the Koda Khel leader, first appealed to the Musa Khel of Mitai, but owing to the influence of Ghairat Khan, a *malik* friendly to Government, he received only very lukewarm promises of support. Mir Baz, Utman Khel, had meanwhile been trying to raise a *lashkar* in Ambahar and the surrounding country, with which to attack Ghulam Khan for his action after the Mirzadher raid. In this he had met with little success, and both he and Mahasil made a further appeal, this time to the Afghan *mullas*. Their success on this occasion was

Gathering of a *lashkar*. immediate. The two notorious *mullas*, the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Hazrat Sahib of Butkhak, both championed their cause, and raised the cry 'jehad' in Ningrahar, at the same time proclaiming Ghulam Khan an infidel. Tribesmen began at once to flock to their standards and in a few days a regular stream of men, amongst whom were many Afghan *khasadars*, began to pour into the Bohai Dag and Kamali from Afghan territory.

On the 12th April the Hazrat Sahib himself arrived in Koda Khel and the Sufi Sahib's son appeared to represent his father, who was ill. Here they were joined by the famous Shakar of Hazarnao with a considerable following, while Mahasil, who had been on the point of paying the fine imposed on the Koda Khel for their share in the recent raids, again plucked up courage and joined the rapidly increasing *lashkar*.

By the 17th April the gathering had assumed such large proportions that a reinforcement of one squadron cavalry, 2 guns, and 550 infantry was sent out to Lieutenant-Colonel Fane, and General Sir James Willcocks himself left Peshawar to arrange the disposal of the force. The fort at Michni was taken over by a garrison of 50 cavalry and 100 infantry from the Border Military Police, and a post was established at Garhi Sadar, between Matta and Abazai.

Meanwhile the *lashkar* had commenced to move in the direction of British territory, and on the 17th was in the Kandahari valley. On the 18th the main body was in Kamali, and here the Hazrat Sahib announced his intention to destroy Ghulam Khan's village on the following day.

On the 19th April their advance was continued by two routes, one column, to which was assigned the destruction of Dag, moving down the Pandiali valley, and the other, under the Hazrat Sahib, by the Gandao valley. As previously arranged, the Pandiali column,

Destruction of Ghulam Khan's  
village, Dag.

with which were the Gud Mulla, Shakar, Mahasil, and Mir Baz, burnt Dag on the

19th, and then marched to the foot of the Burjina Pass, where they bivouacked for the night.

On the gathering of the *lashkar* Ghulam Khan had tried to win over the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel to his cause, but these two clans refused to assist him against such enormous odds. He then sent his brother to ask for the assistance of troops, but it was considered impolitic to help him, and he accordingly decided on flight. He delayed rather long, however, and it was only with difficulty that he escaped at the last moment with his family to Abazai. Here he was offered a portion of the fort for the accommodation of his family and followers, but owing to some disagreement about the necessary space he decided to stay in a village close by.

In the evening of the same day a patrol within our border, west of Matta, was fired on by the advanced guard of the Pandiali Column, and later a desultory long-range fire was opened on the post at Matta. News was then received that an attack on Garhi Sadar during the night was contemplated. As the garrisons in both Garhi Sadar and Matta were weak, Lieutenant-Colonel Fane decided to

withdraw the troops in Garhi Sadar to Matta, and orders were issued to that effect, but owing to various causes the movement could not be immediately carried out, and darkness came on while the party were still on the way. When about one mile from Matta a hot fire was opened on them from both sides of the road, and they had to fight the remainder of the way in, suffering the following casualties :—

1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	.	1 Private killed.
28th Punjabis	.	1 Sepoy wounded.
19th Lancers	.	1 Syce wounded.

After the arrival of the party at Matta the enemy drew off, and contented themselves with firing a few shots during the remainder of the night into Matta Camp.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### *EVENTS DURING THE LATTER PART OF APRIL 1908.*

THE daring incursion into British territory and the attack on British troops, mentioned in the last chapter, clearly showed that the Mohmands were not content with the destruction of Ghulam Khan's village, but were spoiling for a fight.

The situation was decidedly serious as the troops then on the frontier were totally inadequate to prevent so large a *lashkar* from raiding the villages within the border. Moreover, Lieutenant-Colonel Fane's command consisted of a collection of small detachments from different corps, and consequently lacked the strength of a force, equal in number, but composed of complete units.

Sir James Willcocks therefore decided to send out reinforcements and gave orders for a force composed

Brigadier-General Anderson moves to Shabkadar with reinforcements from Peshawar. of 2 guns and 1,300 infantry under Brigadier-General Anderson to move out from Peshawar on the 20th April. There was great delay in starting, however, and it was not till 10-40 A.M. that the advance guard left Peshawar; consequently the troops had to carry out the long march of 18 miles to Shabkadar under a burning sun, and suffered considerably.

In the meanwhile orders were issued for the move of a force composed of 8 guns and 1,300 infantry to Peshawar from Nowshera, and for the 21st Cavalry to march direct from Nowshera Cavalry Cantonment to Shabkadar, *via* Charsada.

Fortunately, while these moves were being carried out the Mohmands, who were also awaiting reinforcements, remained comparatively inactive. With the exception of some firing at Matta on the night of 20th April, nothing further occurred till 8 A.M. on the 21st, when a party of Mohmands opened fire on a cavalry standing patrol, 800 yards west of Matta. This patrol had been ordered to avoid a collision if possible, and accordingly withdrew, but General Willcocks who was in Matta at the time ordered the Field guns to disperse the enemy. Three shells were fired, which had the

desired effect, and no further aggressive movements took place during the day.

On his arrival the previous evening Brigadier-General Anderson had taken over the command of all the troops on the border from Lieutenant-Colonel Fane ; he now moved his Headquarters, together with certain of the troops which he had brought out from Peshawar, to Matta, while Sir James Willcocks left Matta to return to Peshawar.

Whilst *en route* to Peshawar General Willcocks interviewed a number of Halimzai *maliks*, who had come into Shakkadar. These *maliks* stated that the Hazrat Sahib and the Sufi Sahib's son were at Ghalanai in the Gandao valley, and that they themselves had been summoned by the Hazrat Sahib to a general *jirga* of all the Mohmand clans. They asked permission to attend this *jirga*, and at the same time declared that without active support they would be unable to prevent many of their own men from joining the *lashkar*, much less check its advance. General Willcocks advised them to attend the *jirga*, and inform the Hazrat Sahib that no invasion of Mohmand territory was at present contemplated, but that any attack on a British post would meet with immediate reprisals. On their way these *maliks* were met and turned back by the advanced party of the *lashkar*, composed of some 800 to 1,000 Baezai, who had already reached Shahbaz Kor, a village about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Shakkadar.

On their return they reported that the Hazrat Sahib was considering terms, which he would announce to Government. These were supposed to include such impossible clauses as—

- (1) the evacuation of the Malakand ;
- (2) the surrender of Ghulam Khan and the outlaw who had been given up by him ;
- (3) the immediate dispersal of the troops ;

and others equally ridiculous, but they never took shape.

Reports were also received that Mir Sahib Jan. Badshah, a well-known *mulla* of Islampur in Kunar, had joined the enemy assembled at the foot of the Burjina Pass.

In the course of the day General Willcocks received instructions from Army Headquarters at Simla, in which he was informed as to the composition of the force to be used for offensive operations

against the Mohmands, should such a course be decided on by Government.\* He was also directed to modify as far as possible, the disposition of troops on the border, with a view to facilitating the concentration of the selected force, whilst maintaining a sufficient garrison at Peshawar and complete units for the Malakand Moveable Column.

Shortly after dark on the same day the enemy cut the telephone wire between Shabkadar and Matta, carrying off some 400 yards of wire, and later on small parties fired into the posts at Shabkadar and Matta, but without effect.

The following morning signs of great activity amongst the enemy were apparent, and bodies of men, varying from 30 to 60 in number, were visible making *sangars* on the line of foothills, guarding the entrances to the Gandao and Pandiali valleys. Whilst the majority were thus employed, other small parties kept up an intermittent long-range fire all day on Matta itself, wounding a havildar 53rd

\* COMPOSITION OF THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE.

*1st Brigade.*

1st Northumberland Fusiliers	.	.	59th Rifles F. F.
53rd Sikhs F. F.	.	.	Sections A and B, No. 1 British Field Hospital.
57th Rifles F. F.	.	.	No. 101 Native Field Hospital.

*2nd Brigade.*

1st Seaforth Highlanders	.	.	55th Rifles F. F.
Guides Infantry	.	.	Sections C and D, No. 1 British Field Hospital.
28th Punjabis	.	.	No. 102 Native Field Hospital.

*3rd (Reserve) Brigade.*

1st Royal Munster Fusiliers	.	.	40th Pathans.
21st Punjabis	.	.	Sections A and B, No. 7 British Field Hospital.
22d Punjabis	.	.	No. 112 Native Field Hospital. Sections A and B, No. 113 Native Field Hospital.

*Divisional Troops.*

21st Cavalry F. F.	.	.	No. 1 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. G. A.	.	.	No. 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
23rd Mountain Battery	.	.	34th Pioneers.
28th Mountain Battery	.	.	No. 103 Native Field Hospital.

Sikhs during the afternoon. In the evening a patrol of Border Military Police moving from Shabkadar to Matta was attacked on the road, and suffered one or two casualties, and it was not till a party of 50 sabres 21st Cavalry were sent out from Matta to their assistance that the enemy drew off. Some moves took place during the day, and the post at Garhi Sadar, which had been evacuated on the 19th April, was re-established with Colonel Carruthers, 59th Scinde Rifles, in command. The garrison was furnished from Matta, and troops were moved from Shabkadar to replace these, whilst their place was in turn taken by fresh arrivals from Peshawar. At 11 P.M. the same night the posts at Matta and Garhi Sadar were simultaneously attacked—Matta from the north-east and Garhi Sadar from the south-west. The enemy appear to have moved down from the foothills at dark to the Matta—Garhi Sadar road at some point between the two posts. From this place they formed three separate parties, two of which simultaneously opened fire on Matta and Garhi Sadar, thereby covering the third party, which passed through the line of posts and raided the large village of Katozai about 1 mile east of Garhi Sadar. Their object seems mainly to have been the collection of foodstuffs, as the *lashkar* was badly in need of provisions.

The attack on Garhi Sadar, though only resulting in the death of one of the garrison, was of a most determined character. At Matta the enemy were very few in number and did little firing, but the answering fire from the perimeter was exceedingly heavy. The noise had the effect of causing a stampede amongst the cavalry horses and transport animals, which owing to the sandy soil had no difficulty in pulling out their picketting pegs. Several of the horses leaped the perimeter, and forced their way through the barbed wire, on which many of them were terribly lacerated. Outside the camp they broke up into two groups, one of which made for the foothills held by the enemy, who, mistaking them for a cavalry charge, opened a heavy fire on them; the other dashed through the enemy who were attacking Garhi Sadar, scattering them in all directions, and forced their way through the wire entanglement into the camp, some even rushing wildly through the camp and out at the other side. The loss amongst the horses in this stampede was severe; some were shot by the enemy, others lost,

and several so badly injured by the wire that they had to be shot.\* A few men were hurt by the stampede, but no casualties occurred from the enemy's fire.

These were not the only attacks, however, for shortly after the affair at Matta shots were fired into the camp at Shabkadar, and here also the enemy succeeded in drawing our fire.

Another party even penetrated into British territory as far as the bridge over the branch of the Kabul river at Hajizai, and attacked the police post there, wounding one sowar of the Border Military Police.

The general demeanour of the enemy was now bolder owing to our inaction, and on the 23rd they showed standards at various points on the foothills. They still continued to fire at all patrols near Matta, and in the afternoon a large number were observed moving in the direction of Garhi Sadar with standards. These men quickly dispersed, however, when a few shells were fired at them by the field guns in Matta. Altogether they seemed more inclined to risk a fight, and in fact rumours were afloat that the Hazrat Sahib intended to make a general attack on our whole line on Friday, the 24th April.

As further inaction in face of such a fanatical gathering would have in all probability led to very serious trouble along the entire frontier—reports of unrest in Bajaur and attempts to raise rebellion in Upper Swat had already come to hand—General Willcocks decided to forestall any move by the Hazrat Sahib and attack the enemy in position on the following day.

With this intention he issued verbal orders for all the available troops to make a simultaneous attack in two columns, shortly after dawn on the 24th April.

Orders for an attack on the enemy's position on 24th April.

Brigadier-General Anderson, to whom the command of the right column was assigned, was directed to concentrate at Matta the

\* Casualties amongst horses on night of 22nd—23rd April.

	18th Lancers.	21st Cavalry.
Killed by bullets . . . . .	8	4
Wounded by bullets . . . . .	6	0
Injured by wire . . . . .	8	2
Missing (up to 7 P.M. 23rd) . . . . .	24	6
	—	—
	46	12
	—	—

garrisons of Abazai, Garhi Sadar, and Matta, and attack the enemy's left flank, which lay on the foothills covering the Burjina Pass. The left column under Colonel Unwin, 21st Cavalry, received orders to move out of Shabkadar at dawn in the direction of Shahbaz Kor, and carry out a reconnaissance in force of the enemy's right flank, which covered the entrance to the Gandao valley.

During the night the Mohmands were very active and the posts at Shabkadar, Matta, and Garhi Sadar were again fired into, the last named being vigorously attacked, but only one casualty occurred, one sepoy, 57th Rifles, being killed.

Besides these attacks the villages of Batagram, Surikh, Katozai, and three other smaller villages were raided.

In accordance with the orders received from General Willcocks  
Actions of 24th April. on the previous day, the two columns moved out to the attack shortly after dawn on the 24th April.

The left column, under Colonel Unwin, operating from Shabkadar,  
*Composition of Left Column.* advanced to within 2,000 yards of Shahbaz  
18th Battery, R. F. A. Kor, with the cavalry forming the advanced  
2 guns, 22nd Mountain Bat- guard, covered by the fire of the 18th  
ttery. 1 squadron, 21st Cavalry. Battery, R. F. A. Owing to the weakness of  
400 Seaforth Highlanders. the force, however, General Willcocks had  
100 Royal Warwickshire Re- given instructions that an advance into  
giment. 150—28th Punjabis. the hills should on no account be made.

Therefore as the enemy's numbers had been ascertained and the limit of the low foothills had been almost reached, Colonel Unwin gave orders for the retirement to commence about 11-30 A.M. During this movement, which was first covered by the cavalry and later by the Seaforth Highlanders, Lieutenant Gray and one Private, both of the Seaforth Highlanders, were severely wounded.

This reconnaissance in force, though it could not be pressed home as an attack, was nevertheless of great service to the stronger column operating from Matta against the enemy's left flank, as it effectually prevented the enemy from moving up reinforcements from Shahbaz Kor to meet General Anderson's attack.

Simultaneously with the action of the column from Shabkadar, the troops from Matta, Garhi Sadar, and Abazai attacked the enemy

in front of Matta. At 6-30 A.M. the force, strength as per margin,

*Composition of Right Column.*

From Abazai—

250—53rd Sikhs.

From Garhi Sadar—

220—57th Wilde's Rifles.

From Matta—

100—21st Cavalry.

130—19th Lancers.

4 guns, 80th Battery R.F.A.

300—1st Northumberland Fusiliers.

200—1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

150—59th Scinde Rifles.

Colonel Carruthers, 59th Scinde Rifles, in command of the infantry.

At this time the enemy, at least 4,000 strong, were holding the line of *sangars*, which they had prepared and held, through not in such great numbers, during the two previous days. This line covered a front of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles and blocked the road to the Burjina Pass down which reinforcements could be seen approaching.

The first line in the advance which now commenced was composed of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and the 59th Scinde Rifles. Of these the Warwickshires received special orders to capture the dominating feature of the enemy's position, a large hill on the right centre of their line. The advance was supported by the guns, and the 53rd Sikhs and 57th Rifles, as a general reserve, were ordered to keep in advance of but close to the guns, conforming to their movements. The two squadrons cavalry, with the exception of small patrols on the flanks for observation, were kept in hand throughout the fight. The action soon became general along the line and at 9 A.M. Brigadier-General Anderson advanced the guns 1,000 yards nearer to the enemy, in order to support the attack of the Warwickshire Regiment on the principal objective. Ten minutes later the Warwickshires, with a few scouts of the Northumberland Fusiliers, carried this point in fine style, and inflicted severe loss from it on a party of the enemy retiring through a narrow gorge.

The capture of this hill enabled the advance of the centre and right of the line to be pushed home against the *sangars* on the lower foothills in front of the Burjina Pass road. As the fighting

during this stage of the advance was severe, Brigadier-General Anderson ordered the 57th Rifles to move up in support of the 59th Rifles and at 9-30 A.M. the guns—covered by the 53rd Sikhs—were still further advanced to a position some 800 yards nearer the enemy. The effect of this was at once apparent, for the enemy's centre and right *sangars* were quickly carried by the Northumberland Fusiliers, 57th Rifles and 59th Rifles, though not without many casualties; on the right especially there was much close fighting, one of the enemy's *sangars* on this flank being carried by the 57th Rifles and 59th Rifles at the point of the bayonet. As the force under Brigadier-General Anderson was obviously too weak, especially in guns, to advance into the high hills, orders had been issued that no advance should be made beyond certain definite points. These points had now been reached, and all efforts were accordingly turned to inflicting severe punishment on the retreating enemy by heavy fire; and with good effect, for the enemy's losses during the day were later reported to have been as heavy as 800 killed and wounded. By 10-20 A.M. the majority of the enemy had retired to the higher hills over which the track to the Burjina Pass runs, and as they had evidently had a severe lesson Brigadier-General Anderson decided to break off the action.

The withdrawal was steadily carried out in spite of the fire of small bodies of the enemy who, adopting the usual Pathan tactics, followed up the force in its retirement to the plain. All efforts to draw them on, however, in sufficient numbers for the massed cavalry to charge proved unavailing. Some detached parties of the enemy made an attempt to get round the right flank, but were held off by the cavalry.

By 12 noon the whole force had reached the Matta—Garhi Sadar road, with the cavalry out in the plain between the road and the hills to observe any move the enemy might make. The various detachments which had composed the force then returned to the posts from which they had been drawn; the 53rd Sikhs to Abazai, 57th Rifles to Garhi Sadar, and the remainder to Matta.

The casualties, which were heavy for the size of the force engaged, were as follows:—

*British*.—Killed—2 Privates, Northumberland Fusiliers.

Wounded—3 officers and 16 rank and file.

*Native*.—Killed—4 rank and file.

Wounded—1 officer and 30 rank and file .

During the morning the Guides Infantry reached Shabkadar by a splendid forced march from Mardan ; too late, however, to be utilized for the fighting.\*

After these two actions the enemy, who had evidently had enough of it, retired up the Gandao and Pandiali valleys, and no attack was made on any post that night ; and on the following day, when all the available troops were again sent out in two columns to attack the enemy, none were seen in the mouth of the Gandao valley and only a small piquet of six men in the Burjina Pass.

On the 26th April, orders were received constituting the Mohmand Field Force, as previously detailed, with retrospective effect from the 24th April inclusive, and nominating General Sir James Willcocks to command, with supreme military and political control of the operations.

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\* This march deserves a somewhat detailed description. At 4 P.M. on 23rd April a telegram was received in Mardan ordering the Guides Infantry to proceed as strong as possible with Field Service scale of ammunition and kits on lightest possible scale to Shabkadar, where their services were urgently needed.

The Regiment (9 British Officers, 9 Native Officers and 488 rank and file, under Colonel G. J. Younghusband, C.B.) marched at 6-30 P.M., having had to await the arrival of their camels which were out grazing, and soon after midnight passed through Charsada (18 miles). On arriving at the bank of the Khiali branch of the Swat River at 2-15 A.M. on 24th, it was found that the bridge-of-boats had been carried away by floods and that a ferry of two boats was plying in its place. The Regiment was employed till 6 A.M. in getting the 1st Line transport, Maxim gun mules and horses across, and the march was resumed at 6-15 A.M., one British Officer being left behind with two companies to get the camels across and bring them on to Shabkadar. The Regiment arrived at Shabkadar at 11 A.M., having accomplished the march of 35 miles from Mardan in 16½ hours, of which 4 hours were occupied in ferrying across the Khiali River. No men fell out during the march.

The firing ceased immediately after the arrival of the Regiment at Shabkadar, and the remainder of the day was spent in entrenching.

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## CHAPTER V.

### *INCURSION OF THE SUFI SAHIB'S LASHKAR INTO THE KHAIBAR, AND MEASURES TAKEN TO REPEL THE SAME.*

FOR some days after the action of the 24th April there was a lull in the operations. Reconnaissances were made up the mouths of the Gandao and Pandiali valleys, but these disclosed no signs of the enemy, and it was evident, both from this and from information brought to the Political officers, that the enemy had completely dispersed from the neighbourhood of British territory.

During this period the redistribution of troops necessary for the concentration of the Mohmand Field Force was actively carried out. By the end of the month the three Brigades were nearly complete, and on the 30th April Major-General A. A. Barrett, C.B., in command of the 2nd Brigade, arrived and moved his headquarters to Jangli Burj, a village about half-way between Shabkadar and Matta, where a flying column under Colonel Younghusband of the Guides had been established.

The force was almost ready for an advance directly orders should be received, when a sudden diversion in the direction of the Khaibar made the immediate punishment of the Mohmands of secondary importance for the moment.

The Sufi Sahib, who had been prevented by illness, and by his jealousy of the Hazrat Sahib, from joining the Mohmand *lashkar*, had succeeded in raising a second *lashkar* in Ningrahar and the neighbouring districts of Afghanistan. This force, which was composed almost entirely of Afghan subjects, now advanced to the head of the Khaibar valley and threatened Landi Kotal.

Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Political Agent in the Khaibar, The Sufi Sahib's *lashkar* wired on the 1st May that the enemy enters the Khaibar. had crossed the border in considerable numbers, and that the Sufi Sahib's emissaries were attempting to bring about a general rising among the Loargai Shinwaris and in Tirah.

This message was followed on the 2nd May by a request for regular troops despatched. regular troops to be sent as far as Jamrud. This was received by General Willcocks at 9 A.M. on the 2nd May, and he at once issued orders for the following moves to take place :—

(a) The Reserve Brigade, with 4 guns, 80th Battery R. F. A., 28th Mountain Battery, and 1 Squadron, 19th Lancers, under Brigadier-General Ramsay, C.B., from Peshawar to Jamrud.

(b) Two guns, 18th Battery, R.F.A., from Shabkadar, and 23rd Mountain Battery, Seaforth Highlanders and Guides Infantry from Jangli Burj, under Major-General Barrett, C.B., to Peshawar, *en route* for the Khaibar.

(c) The 54th Sikhs by rail from Nowshera to Peshawar.

In order to keep the troops fresh and ready to continue their march on the following day, transport carts were provided for the conveyance of the British troops, as they naturally suffered considerably from the great heat then prevailing.

General Willcocks himself moved *via* Peshawar to Jamrud, where on his arrival at 6 P.M. he found Brigadier-General Ramsay with the 3rd Brigade, less the 22nd Punjabis and 2 guns, 28th Mountain Battery, which had marched straight through to Ali Masjid.

The situation at this time appeared so serious that orders were issued from Army Headquarters for the mobilization of two additional brigades, designated the 4th and 5th Brigades.

The enemy, who were now estimated at from 13,000 to 20,000 strong, were reported to be advancing and the Political Agent wired that he expected an attack that night. The Sufi Sahib himself was reported at this time to be at Khwar at the head of the Bazar Valley with 8,000 men. During the night the fort and *sarai* at Landi Kotal were fired into, but the enemy put all their energy into an

Attack on blockhouse at Michni Kandao. attack on an almost impregnable stone blockhouse at Michni Kandao. The vigour of their assault may be estimated from the fact that scaling-ladders were actually planted against the walls, one of which was captured by the garrison. The attack was easily beaten off by the Khaibar Rifles, who succeeded in inflicting some loss on the enemy, while only one of the garrison was wounded.

At Jamrud a few shots were fired into the camp the same night from a village close by, wounding a Non-Commissioned Officer and a Private, both of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, but this was evidently the work of local *badmashes*.

Next morning the troops under Brigadier-General Ramsay pushed on to Landi Kotal, Major-General Barrett's force reached Ali Masjid, and the 54th Sikhs arrived at Jamrud from Nowshera by rail.

General Willcocks left Jamrud and, pushing on with the cavalry after passing Ali Masjid, reached Landi Kotal at 2 P.M. Here he found that the enemy were still keeping up a desultory fire on the blockhouses west of Landi Kotal, and he decided to attack them on the following morning.

These prompt measures on our part, and their own failure to cause an Afridi rising, disheartened the enemy, and the majority left during the night, only a few shots being fired at Landi Kotal after dark.

Next morning, the 4th April, in accordance with orders issued Action at Khargali. over-night, the troops moved out of Landi Kotal at 7 A.M. to attack the enemy in position in and around Bagh and Khargali villages.

Two columns were formed ; the right column under Colonel Roos-Keppel receiving instructions to operate towards Landi Khana, in order to cut off the enemy's retreat in the direction of Tor Kham, and at the same time guard the right flank of the left column under Brigadier-General Ramsay, which was to make a frontal attack.

As the troops advanced, however, it was soon evident that with the exception of some 20 men, who kept up a long-range fire, retreating as the troops advanced, the enemy did not intend to fight, and in fact that the majority had already fled. The advance continued as far as a ridge beyond East Khargali village. Here some loss was inflicted on the enemy by rifle fire, and by the guns which fired several rounds at small parties of the enemy escaping over the Shamsha and Made Kandao.\* By this time it was clear that there was no chance of cutting off the few enemy who remained and the withdrawal to camp was commenced at about 11 A.M. This retirement was not molested by the enemy to any appreciable extent

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\* The field-guns had come into action on the northern Landi Kotal-Landi Khana road below Michni Kandao blockhouse.

as only a few men followed up cautiously, firing at about 1,000 yards range. The casualties during the day were few: Lieutenant Campbell and one Sepoy, 40th Pathans, were wounded in the advance, and one Private, Royal Munster Fusiliers, was wounded by our own fire during the retirement. The enemy's losses were reported as 72 killed and wounded, and most of these are said to have occurred as they retired by the Made and Shamsha Kandao.

During the greater part of the forenoon the weather was very unsettled, heavy showers alternating with a cold wind, and at times thick mist totally obscured the enemy's position.

By next morning no enemy were in the vicinity, and as all danger seemed to be past the troops commenced to retire from the Khaibar on the 7th May.

On the 6th May an Afridi band successfully raided the camels of the 50th Camel Corps at Ali Masjid. The gang, who were led by the notorious Zakka Khel raider Multan, drove off some

Raid at Ali Masjid.

eight camels which were grazing outside the piquet line. A party composed of one company, Guides Infantry, one company, Khaibar Rifles, and 24 sowars, 19th Lancers, at once set out in pursuit. Major Coape-Smith, 11th Lancers, commanding the 50th Camel Corps, accompanied the cavalry, who actually saw the camels being driven off in the direction of Chora. As it was by this time getting dark—the raid took place in the evening—the party decided to relinquish the pursuit and commenced the return journey to camp. When about 2 miles from Ali Masjid the cavalry were ambushed, Major Coape-Smith mortally wounded, and three horses and a rifle lost in the confusion. Two of these horses were recovered, however, on the following day by two companies of the 22nd Punjabis.

The return of the troops from the Khaibar was spread over three days. On the 7th May the 2nd Brigade

Return of troops from the Khaibar to Peshawar.

moved to Jamrud, and the 3rd Brigade, leaving one section 28th Mountain Battery at Landi Kotal, halted at Ali Masjid. On the 8th May the 2nd Brigade marched to Peshawar, and the 3rd Brigade reached Jamrud. On the 9th May the movement was completed by the arrival of the 3rd Brigade at Peshawar.

About this time the cholera which had been prevalent for some time in the Peshawar district began to affect the troops on the Mohmand border.   
Outbreak of cholera.

The fort at Shabkadar, which had for a long time now been much overcrowded, was highly insanitary, and the troops were accordingly moved out into camp about  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile to the west of Shabkadar village on the Shabkadar-Michni road, only a small garrison being left in the fort.

The troops in the Khaibar were also affected and on their return it was found necessary to segregate the 21st Punjabis at Kacha Garhi and the Guides Infantry at Daudzai Tahsil.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### *ADVANCE OF THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE TO NAHAKKI.*

ON the return of the troops from the Khaibar to Peshawar sanction for an immediate advance into Mohmand country. immediate advance into the Mohmand

country. Before, however, this advance could commence, it was first necessary to concentrate the two brigades detailed for the expedition at the mouth of the Gandao valley, and also to hand over all the posts on the border and on the lines of communications to the 3rd (Reserve) brigade. With this object the troops from the Khaibar were moved forward, as follows, on the 10th May :—

- (a) Major-General Barrett, with the 23rd Mountain Battery and Seaforth Highlanders, marched from Peshawar to Naguman half-way between Peshawar and Shabkadar, where they were joined at 11 P.M. that night by the 54th Sikhs from Jamrud, who took the place of the Guides Infantry segregated for cholera at Daudzai.
- (b) Brigadier-General Ramsay's Brigade to Naguman, where they encamped alongside the 2nd Brigade. The 21st Punjabis, amongst whom no fresh cases of cholera had occurred, rejoined this brigade at 7 A.M.

The following day the headquarters of the 3rd Brigade moved to a camp on the right bank of the Subhan Khwar, opposite the 1st Brigade camp on the Shabkadar-Michni road. The remainder of the brigade moved into some of the forts and posts on the line of communication. Throughout the day the 2nd Brigade remained halted at Naguman. In the afternoon General Willcocks held a conference, at which he explained to his Brigade Commanders the general plan for the operations about to commence.

On the 12th May the concentration was completed ; the 2nd Brigade advanced to Hafiz Kor on the border, where they were joined in the course of the day by the various units of the brigade which had not been moved to the Khaibar ; the 3rd Brigade took over the remaining posts on the line of communication.

During the day a reconnaissance was carried out by three squadrons 21st Cavalry under Colonel Unwin, as far as Dand. No signs of the enemy were seen. Under cover of this reconnaissance the field telegraph wire was laid as far as Reg Mena, about half-way to Dand.

Cholera, which had appeared during the absence of the troops in the Khaibar, now suddenly became virulent. The 1st Northumberland Fusiliers were the first to be seriously affected and finally, on the advice of the Principal Medical Officer, it was decided to eliminate them from the 1st Brigade. The Royal Munster Fusiliers of the 3rd Brigade, who were at the time in camp on the right bank of the Subhan Khwar, were also attacked—four cases and five suspected cases occurring in this regiment in one day. The vacancy in the 1st Brigade was filled by the 22nd Punjabis from the 3rd Brigade, and to fill the gaps thus caused the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment and the 1-4th Gurkhas were hastily moved up from Nowshera. The latter regiment, however, succumbed almost immediately to the epidemic, and had to be replaced by the 19th Punjabis.

On the 13th May, as all preparations were complete, the advance was commenced, and the 1st Brigade, with attached troops as per margin, crossed the border and marched to Dand.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE  
ADVANCE.  
*Troops attached to the 1st  
Brigade.*

2 Squadrons, 21st Cavalry.  
No. 8 Mountain Battery.  
2 Sections, 28th Mountain

Battery.

34th Sikh Pioneers.  
54th Sikhs (from the 2nd  
Brigade).

No. 6 Company, Sappers and  
Miners.

Telephone section.  
Telegraph section.

As the Tarakzai, through whose territory the road lay, had remained friendly throughout, no opposition was expected, but as a precautionary measure the heights on either side of the road were picquettet by troops from the 2nd Brigade, which remained at Hafiz Kor till the following day. As far as Hafiz Kor the road had been made passable for wheeled traffic during the

three weeks which had elapsed since the action at Matta. From this point up to within one mile of Dand but little difficulty was experienced with the transport; here, however, the track falls sharply into the bed of the Gandao stream and much time was spent before a sufficiently graded descent could be made over

the slippery rock. On arrival in camp large fatigue parties were sent out to improve the road to be covered on the following day in the direction of the Karappa Pass. These parties returned to camp at 6 P.M., after working up to within 3 miles of the pass itself.

During the evening news was received that a gathering of the enemy, which had been in the neighbourhood of the Khapak and Nahakki Passes, had dispersed and that consequently no organised opposition would probably be met with.

The camping ground at Dand was found far too small for so large a force, and the cavalry horses and transport animals were exceedingly cramped. Water, though plentiful from large pools in the Gandao stream, is brackish and decidedly indifferent in quality. Moreover, the camp is commanded on all sides, and a very large portion of the force was of necessity utilised for pickets.

At dawn on the following day a flying column, strength as per

*Flying Column.*

2 Squadron 21st Cavalry.  
4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Battery.  
1 Section, No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners.  
22nd Punjabis.  
53rd Sikhs.

margin, under Brigadier-General Anderson, pushed on as rapidly as possible to Nahakki, in order to forestall any attempt the enemy might make to cut the *band* of the water tank, which formed the main source of water supply at that place.

General Willcocks himself accompanied

this column. At starting much difficulty was experienced in getting clear of camp owing to the narrow exit, and later further delay was caused by the bad state of the road near the Karappa Pass which had not been improved on the previous day. A halt was made for water near Durba Khel in the territory of the Gandao Halimzai,—the highest point at which the Gandao stream appears above ground—and the march was then resumed to the Nahakki Pass, where the road was also found to be in an execrable state, showing practically no signs of the work done on it in 1897. The village at the foot of the pass showed signs of a hasty flight by the enemy, and a group of the enemy was seen on the high hill overlooking Nahakki from the east, but these were dispersed by a few shells. Shortly after the arrival of the column, a squadron which had been detached at Kasai in the Gandao to reconnoitre the Khapak Pass reached Nahakki, and reported the Khapak Pass to be held by the enemy.

Meanwhile the remainder of the 1st Brigade, less the 54th Sikhs left at Dand, marched to Ghalanai in Gandao, and encamped close to the stream. The rear-guard of this force, delayed by the difficult exit from camp, did not get clear of Dand till 3-30 P.M., thereby keeping the 2nd Brigade, which had arrived from Hafiz Kor at 10A.M., waiting  $5\frac{1}{2}$  hours on the road. To avoid the overcrowding at Dand, which had occurred on the previous night, 2 squadrons 21st Cavalry, Guides Infantry and 55th Rifles, marched straight through, under Colonel Younghusband of the Guides, to Ghalanai, where they joined the troops of the 1st Brigade encamped at that place.

On the 15th May the remainder of the 1st Brigade, together with the 2 squadrons 21st Cavalry attached to the 2nd Brigade, joined the flying column at Nahakki, leaving 4 Companies 34th Pioneers at Ghalanai to improve the road for the 2nd Brigade which moved up during the day to Ghalanai. Such delay occurred however in getting the camel transport of this brigade from Dand to the Karappa, in spite of the work of the Pioneers on the road, that it was midnight before the rear-guard got into camp at Ghalanai. During the day a second reconnaissance of the Khapak Pass, was carried out by one squadron 21st Cavalry.

Reconnaissance of the Kha.  
pak Pass.

Though information that the pass was held had previously been received, no enemy were seen till the leading men reached a point about 1,000 yards from the pass and commenced to dismount. A hot fire was then suddenly opened on them, and in a short time three sowars and three horses were wounded, of which two of the latter had subsequently to be shot. The cavalry then retired, followed up for a short distance by the enemy. At the sound of the firing infantry were pushed up in support, but by this time the cavalry were out of danger. The enemy's numbers were estimated at from 500—1,000 men.

The same day Brigadier-General Anderson moved out of Nahakki,

2 squadrons, 21st Cavalry.

2 guns, No. 8 Mountain  
Battery.

53rd Sikhs.

Reconnaissance into the Kan-  
dahari plain from Nahakki.

with force as per margin, and carried out a reconnaissance first to Lakai, thence to

Haidar Kalai and back over the Darwaza-  
gai Pass to camp at Nahakki. When  
the force debouched from the pass separat-

ing Lakai and Haidar Kalai, the cavalry turning to the right

reconnoitred up the Kandahari plain for about 4 miles in the direction of Lakarai. Some fourteen villages were burnt during the day, but though large numbers of the enemy gathered in front of the cavalry, few attempted to follow up the retirement, most opposition being met with when retiring through the Darwazagai gorge. No casualties occurred during the day.

The field telegraph, which had been laid to Dand on the 13th and Ghalanai on the 14th, was now completed as far as Nahakki.

At dusk the same evening the enemy commenced a desultory fire on the 1st Brigade camp at Nahakki, which was kept up till 3 A.M. A Subadar, 59th Rifles, was slightly wounded, one mule driver killed and another wounded ; some animals were also hit.

On the 16th May the 2nd Brigade moved to Nahakki, taking over that place from the 1st Brigade, which moved to Kasai, a village about 3 miles distant, at the foot of the Darwazagai Pass.

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## CHAPTER V

### *OPERATIONS OF THE 16th AND 17th MAY.*

ON the 16th May notices were issued from Nahakki to all the clans informing them that we had no intention of annexing their country, and that at the conclusion of the operations there would be no change in our relations with them.

On the same day the punishment of the Khwaizai was commenced. At 5-30 A.M. a column under Brigadier-General Anderson, strength as per margin, moved out of Nahakki and advanced up the Bohai Dag with the object of blocking the northern side of

2 Squadrons, 21st Cavalry.  
4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Battery.  
57th Rifles.  
59th Rifles.

the Khapak Pass, in conjunction with an attack upon the pass from the south by troops from the 2nd Brigade, should the pass be still held by the enemy.

In the meantime the remainder of the 1st Brigade were ordered to move the baggage and supplies of the 1st Brigade from Nahakki to Kasai, and prepare a new camp at that place, ready for the column on its return in the evening. The post at Nahakki was held by the 22nd Punjabis until relieved by the 2nd Brigade.

Orders had been issued to the cavalry to push on as fast as possible to the Khapak Pass, keeping up communication however with the brigade, while the remainder of the force moved along the base of the hills on the south bank of the Bohai Dag, passing to the south of Ato Khel village, which point was reached at 7-30 A.M. The cavalry however on approaching Sur Dag found several of the enemy holding the hills south of that village, and were forced to engage them in a dismounted action before any further advance could be made.

At 8-45 A.M., the advance-guard of the infantry was fired on from the spur north of Zanawar China village. The column accordingly moved into the bed of the Bohai Dag, while a double company was sent to gain possession of a long spur, which runs in a north-westerly direction between the villages of Gudai Tangi and Ahad Kor, and the seizure of which would protect the left flank.

When this had been done, the advance was continued with this double company as a pivot, as far as Ahad Kor. Here the column watered from a large tank known as Ata Jor, which is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of Khan Beg Kor on the left bank of a *nala* joining the Bohai Dag from the foot of the Khapak Pass.

Meanwhile the cavalry had been kept on the right front with orders to advance towards the Khapak Pass. At this moment some of the enemy were observed close to the south-east end of Khan Beg Kor, but these were quickly dispersed by the guns, and the advance was then resumed as far as a spur lying to the south-east of Ahad Kor. This was occupied by a double company, with the cavalry in front in Khapak village. It was now seen that the pass itself was already held by the 55th Rifles from the 2nd Brigade; the column was accordingly halted, and the destruction of the surrounding villages was commenced. This was completed by 2. P.M., without molestation from the enemy, except for some shots fired at the cavalry in Khapak village, and the retirement was then commenced with the 59th Rifles forming the rear-guard. As soon as the rear-guard reached the junction of the Khapak and Bohai Dag *nalas*, the enemy began to follow up the retirement with gradually increasing numbers and boldness; and as casualties commenced to occur a double company 57th Rifles was placed in ambush, a short distance to the west of Ato Khel. This double company, allowing the rear-guard to pass through them in their retirement, were enabled to pour a heavy fire into the following enemy, hitting three of them. Then, as the retirement was continued, two guns were ordered into action just north of Ato Khel village to cover the final movement into camp at Kasai. During this withdrawal from the Khapak, the 59th Rifles, who formed the rear-guard suffered nine casualties, *viz.*, one native officer killed and one native officer and seven men wounded, whilst the double company 57th Rifles, placed in ambush near Ato Khel, had one man wounded in retiring.

On arrival in camp the occupation of the eight previously selected piquets was carried out, though not without some difficulty, as the enemy kept up a desultory fire on the piquets while building *sangars*, by which one man 22nd Punjabis was wounded.

In the meanwhile as the scouts of a half-company 59th Rifles were advancing to take possession of No. 8 Piquet, some 1,500 yards south of the camp, fire was suddenly opened on them from the low hill on which the piquet was to be placed ; two men were hit and the half-company forced to retire. Artillery fire was then brought to bear on the hill from camp, and the 59th Rifles received orders to take the hill, under cover of the guns. This was well and quickly done, with the further loss of one man.

The digging of the perimeter was then resumed and completed during which time the piquets on the north side of camp reported that the enemy were collecting on the hills to the north-west, and in the valley to the north of camp, on the further side of the Darwazagai Pass. Other parties of the enemy were observed on both sides of the Bohai Dag, near Ato Khel village, but it was too dark to take any offensive action.

Before darkness had completely set in firing into camp commenced and large numbers of the enemy began to gather round Nos. 6 and 7 Piquets, on the west side of camp, held by the 22nd Punjabis, while others moved towards Nos. 1 and 2 Piquets on the north-east, held by the 57th Rifles. The centre piquets held by the 53rd Sikhs were almost entirely unmolested. The night which now commenced was extremely dark—thick clouds obscuring the moon—whilst later it became cold and sharp showers of rain began to fall. Firing round the above-mentioned piquets soon became heavy, and the enemy could be plainly heard shouting, blowing calls on a trumpet, and playing *dols*. Shortly after 9 P.M. Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler, commanding the 22nd Punjabis, reported to General Anderson that Nos. 6 and 7 Piquets had signalled asking for more ammunition, and saying that many casualties had already occurred, whilst the enemy, who were close all round the *sangars*, were rapidly increasing in numbers. General Anderson, therefore, ordered a double lamp signalling station to be established in that part of the 22nd Punjabis' perimeter, which lay nearest to the two piquets. Both piquets then signalled down that they were hard pressed. Soon after this the lamp of No. 6 Piquet was put out of action. Shortly after 10 P.M. two men of No. 6 Piquet managed to make their way into camp down the eastern slope of the hill, and reported that ammu-

nition was running low, that two non-commissioned officers had been killed, several other men wounded, and that the enemy were so numerous and so close to the piquet, that unless reinforced there was great danger that the piquet might be rushed. At the same time a lamp message was received from No. 7 Piquet reporting that the native officer and a non-commissioned officer had been wounded,—the command devolving upon Naik Jehandad Khan—and that the enemy, who completely surrounded the *sangar* on three sides, were very numerous.

As the camp would have at once become untenable had either of the piquets been carried by the enemy, besides the loss of life, rifles and ammunition entailed, General Anderson decided immediately to reinforce No. 6, where the pressure was greatest. About this time another sepoy arrived from No. 6 Piquet, shot through the arm, and confirmed the previous report. All arrangements were quickly made, officers were posted round the perimeter to prevent any fire from the perimeter during the advance of the reinforcing party, and all piquets were warned that No. 6 Piquet was about to be reinforced. Ammunition carriers with plenty of ammunition were got ready, and a pass word agreed on. About 11 P.M. the reinforcement consisting of 50 rifles 22nd Punjabis under command of Major Climo (24th Punjabis, attached to 22nd Punjabis), and Lieutenants Webb and Money, 22nd Punjabis, and accompanied by the company *dol* and *sarnai* players, moved out of the camp. As they approached the lower slopes of the hill on which No. 6 Piquet was situated, heavy fire was opened upon them by the enemy. The *dols* and *sarnais* struck up, and they advanced, driving the enemy down the further side of the ridge and reached the piquet. Major Climo then signalled that in his opinion the hill should be held for the remainder of the night by a double company, and to this General Anderson agreed. Rain began to fall heavily and as it had now become very cold Major Climo again signalled down, this time requesting that a relief party might be sent with blankets, waterproof sheets, and filled water bottles for those remaining on the hill, and also blanket-stretchers to take down the dead and wounded, who occupied nearly all the available space in the piquet. Arrangements were made for the two parties to meet at the bottom of the hill below the piquet, and a double

company 22nd Punjabis, under Captain Cooke (24th Punjabis attached 22nd Punjabis), then started.

Meanwhile the enemy, who had been to some extent driven away from No. 6 Piquet, commenced a most determined close attack on No. 7, which however managed to hold its own. The signaller in this piquet, Sepoy Ram Singh, 22nd Punjabis, in the endeavour to keep touch with Nahakki as well as with the camp at Kasai, worked his lamp outside the piquet, as something interfered with the line to Nahakki, until he was wounded. He then got into the *sangar* and took a rifle, but the enemy were so close to him that they captured his lamp.

The relief party meanwhile reached No. 6 Piquet and at 2 A.M. the dead and wounded were brought in, followed shortly after by all the men not left on the hill.

Throughout this time Nos. 1 and 2 Piquets held by the 57th Rifles had both been hotly engaged, but succeeded in repulsing the enemy without loss to themselves, though three rifles were cut through the barrel by bullets and completely destroyed. All the piquets engaged reported that they had seen many dead and wounded Mohmands being carried down the hills, and the two men of No. 6 Piquet, who made their way into camp, stated that many dead bodies were passed on the way down the hill to camp. At 2-15 A.M. the enemy drew off and firing was subsequently slight. The total casualties during the night amounted to one native officer and seven men killed, and eleven men wounded, all of the 22nd Punjabis, and of these all, except one man shot in camp, and one of the reinforcing party, occurred in Nos. 6 and 7 Piquets.

The following day was spent by both brigades in the destruction of villages within reach of the two camps, Kasai and Nahakki.

From Kasai a column, strength as per margin, left camp at

1 Squadron, 21st Cavalry.  
3 sections, No. 6 Company,  
Sappers and Miners.

4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Battery.

22nd Punjabis.

53rd Sikhs.

8 A.M., and proceeding over the Darwazagai Pass advanced up the Kandahari valley. The enemy showed little inclination to fight, and though large numbers were seen on the hills some fourteen villages were burnt and two towers destroyed almost without opposition. At 1-30 P.M. the column commenced its retirement, and, though a few of the enemy

attempted to follow up, reached camp at Kasai without a single casualty, the hills in this valley being well suited for a rear-guard action.

From Nahakki the 2nd Brigade sent out two columns, strength

*1<sup>st</sup> Column—*

4 guns, 23rd Mountain Battery.

Seaforth Highlanders.

54th Sikhs.

3 sections, No. 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.

*2<sup>nd</sup> Column—*

1 Squadron, 21st Cavalry.

2 guns, 23rd Mountain Battery.

28th Punjabis.

1 Company, 34th Pioneers :

Chingai. Here also the enemy seemed disinclined to fight, and only some slight opposition was offered by a number of men on the heights above Sro and Gumbatai, but these were quickly dislodged by the guns, and both columns returned to camp without suffering any casualties. Near Sro a spring of excellent water was discovered. This was cleaned out, and from this date drinking water for the camp at Nahakki was drawn from this place.

It had been intended that General Barrett's column, in addition to destroying the villages mentioned above, should carry out a reconnaissance of the Inzari Pass leading into the Pandiali valley. To this end the Officer Commanding 54th Sikhs was ordered to advance with his battalion along the high ground on the right flank of General Barrett's column, until he reached a position overlooking the pass, and covering the approach thereto from the north-west. Owing, however, to some misunderstanding of the orders received by him, he halted his battalion far short of the position intended, and the project had therefore to be abandoned.

As usual firing into camp was carried on for several hours that night, but only one casualty resulted.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### *OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BRIGADE AGAINST THE KHWAIZAI; MAY 18th, 19th AND 20th.*

ALL the country within reach of Nahakki had now suffered severely, and Sir James Willcocks decided to send out a column to punish the Khwaizai still further, and, if possible, destroy the Koda Khel villages at the head of the Bohai Dag at the same time.

For this purpose he gave orders for the 2nd Brigade, reinforced by the 57th Rifles from Kasai, to leave Nahakki next day, the 18th, and advance up the Bohai Dag, returning to Nahakki on the 3rd day.

At 5-30 A.M. therefore on the 18th, the 2nd Brigade moved out from Nahakki, and passing close to the 1st brigade camp at Kasai, where they were joined by the 57th Rifles, commenced to advance up the bed of the Bohai Dag *nala*. Meanwhile the pickets overlooking Nahakki were taken over by the 59th Rifles, the remainder of the 1st Brigade with all the baggage leaving Kasai for Nahakki at 12-30 P.M.

Shortly after passing Halimzai limits the 2nd Brigade was fired on from both sides of the valley, and it quickly became evident that the enemy, who held a position extending for about 2 miles from the half ruined village of Sur Dag on the right, along the steep ridge north of the road to the high range above Mazrina, would have to be dislodged before any further advance could be made. In addition to this position the enemy also held the spurs overlooking Zanawar China on the south side of the road, and the village itself. The advance-guard, which was composed of two squadrons 21st Cavalry and the 55th Rifles under Colonel Nicholls, were soon hotly engaged, the cavalry leading the advance dismounted.

As it was advisable first to clear Zanawar China and the spurs above it the 28th Punjabis were sent to storm these heights, supported by two guns of the 28th Mountain Battery and the half battalion of the 34th Pioneers, the latter being ordered to move straight on the village and destroy its defences.

Meanwhile the 23rd Mountain Battery had come into action against the heights to the north, which were strongly held by the enemy. As the attack of the 28th Punjabis on the heights to the south developed, orders were issued to the 57th Rifles to carry those to the north, covered by the fire of the guns and of the dismounted cavalry and the 55th Rifles, with the Seaforth Highlanders and 54th Sikhs in reserve. Major Gray, commanding the 57th Rifles, planned and conducted this attack with promptness and skill, and it was carried out with great spirit. No sooner were the lower slopes of the hill in our possession, than large numbers of the enemy, who had been holding the ravines below, commenced to climb the steep rocky face of the hill towards the left of their position, where they came under a brisk fire from guns, rifles and maxims, and suffered heavy loss, the survivors making good their escape over the high ridge towards Mazrina. Further to the left the 57th Rifles continued to force their way up, and after some hand to hand fighting gradually succeeded in dislodging the enemy. Many dead bodies were passed on the way up and five prisoners taken, four of whom were wounded.

The action was now over ; to the left the 28th Punjabis had been equally successful in clearing the spurs above Zanawar China, whilst the Pioneers had quickly gained possession of the village itself. Here an unfortunate incident occurred, as, while the Pioneers were engaged in the destruction of the village, a party of 8 swordsmen, who had remained concealed in a cave in the hillside near by, made a sudden attack upon the Pioneers who, being taken at a disadvantage, lost 3 of their number killed and 2 wounded before the *ghazis* were disposed of. The 55th Rifles had meanwhile been occupied further west beyond Gudai Tangi, and the Sappers and Miners now received orders to destroy the defences of that village, and also those of Sur Dag.

Our casualties in this action were as follows :—

3 British officers wounded.*	3 Native ranks died of wounds.
3 Native ranks killed.	21 Native ranks wounded.

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\* Lieutenant Ivens, 26th Punjabis (attached 25th Rifles)—dangerously wounded.  
 Captain Finlay, 58th Rifles (attached 57th Rifles)—slightly wounded.  
 Lieutenant Sparling—57th Rifles, slightly wounded.

Those of the enemy, whose numbers were estimated at from 500—1,000, were computed at 60.

The enemy had now completely disappeared, and, the road being clear, the advance was continued. The cavalry were ordered to move to Khan Beg Kor, covering the front and right flank of the infantry ; the Seaforth Highlanders, 54th Sikhs and 23rd Mountain Battery were directed to march straight to the Ata Jor tank, which had been selected as the camping ground for the night, and the remaining troops were told to follow as soon as the destruction of the various towers and villages had been completed.

On arrival at the tank detachments from each corps were left to dig the entrenchments, whilst the remainder advanced to Khan Beg Kor, and attacked the ridge behind the village, which had been reported to be strongly held by the enemy. In this attack the 54th Sikhs formed the right, and the Seaforth Highlanders the left, with the guns of the 23rd Mountain Battery covering the advance. Little opposition was met with, however, and, in spite of the difficult ground, the ridge was quickly in our possession, and a squadron of cavalry advanced as far as the foot of the pass in rear of the village. Here there was another tank, and all the transport animals were sent for to get water and forage, while the Sappers and Pioneers blew up the numerous towers.

The camp that night being on an open plain, no outlying pickets were posted, and though firing was continuous and fairly heavy throughout the night, very little damage was done.

Next day at 5-30 A.M. the force advanced to Kung, the largest of the Khwaizai villages. The 54th Sikhs, who formed the advance-guard, piquetted the spurs of the range south-east and south of the village, while the Seaforth Highlanders and a double company 55th Rifles occupied a steep ridge to the north ; the cavalry meanwhile operated in the main valley in the direction of Koda Khel, thereby guarding the left flank and rear of the brigade. Very little opposition was offered, however, and, as soon as the crest of the heights was in our possession, the Sappers and Pioneers were enabled to enter the village and commence the work of destruction, a few shots only being fired at them from the high crags in rear of the village.

It had been General Barrett's original intention to continue his advance to the Baezai village of Koda Khel and destroy that village the same day; but this could only have been done if the work of destruction of Kung had been completed by 10 A.M. at the latest. The opposition met with at Kung had, however, delayed matters and it was nearly midday before the village was finished with. Owing partly to this fact, and also to the difficult nature of the ground which would have had to be traversed in the retirement to Ata Jor camp from Koda Khel, the idea of visiting that village had to be abandoned. When all the towers of Kung therefore had been blown up the main body of the force withdrew to the south-east towards Wucha Jawar, the 54th Sikhs remaining in position to cover the advance, whilst the 28th Punjabis crossed by a pass south-east of Kung to the heights overlooking Wucha Jawar from the north. The towers of this village were then destroyed, as also those of a smaller village further south called Shah Katol. The whole force then returned to camp, which had been held during the day by a half battalion, 28th Punjabis, and a company from each of the other regiments under the command of Colonel Phillips.

Firing into camp that night resulted in one sepoy and one follower being wounded.

Next day the entire baggage of the column, escorted by the 57th Rifles, 55th Rifles and 2 guns 28th Mountain Battery, under Colonel Nicholls, was sent back to Nahakki, leaving Ata Jor camp at 6 A.M. The remainder of the force marched at 5.30 A.M. to Mazrina. Covered by the cavalry the 54th Sikhs piquetted the hills to the west of Mazrina and the 28th Punjabis those to the east; the march was practically unopposed, and the village of Mazrina and the hills around were soon in our possession. The towers, etc., were then destroyed by the Sappers and Pioneers, after which the column commenced its retirement from the Mazrina valley. This movement was the occasion for a desultory fire being opened on the piquets in the hills, but the column itself was withdrawn without incident. Meanwhile the cavalry had been engaged all the morning with small parties of the enemy, who had come down to the deserted camping ground at Ata Jor soon after the departure of the baggage. Throughout the retirement down the Bohai Dag the

rear-guard, composed of the 54th Sikhs, was freely engaged for a great part of the way in, and suffered 5 casualties whilst one man of the 21st Cavalry was also wounded. On arrival at Kasai the 57th Rifles—part of the baggage escort—rejoined the 1st Brigade, which had left Nahakki the same day to commence a tour, which should deal with the Utmanzai, Safis, Dawezai, and Ambahar Utman Khel in the order named.

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## CHAPTER IX.

### *OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE FROM 20th TO 26th MAY.*

WHILST the 2nd brigade was engaged in the Bohai Dag, Sir James Willcocks and the 1st Brigade remained in camp at Nahakki. Here on both nights, 18th and 19th, the camp was heavily fired into, the enemy, said to be Dawezai and Utmanzai, accompanying their fire with tom-toms and much shouting and abuse. On the 18th one man was killed and one wounded, and on the 19th three men were wounded and several animals hit.

On the 19th Sir James Willcocks issued orders to Brigadier 2 Squadrons, 21st Cavalry.  
No. 8 British Mountain Battery.  
No. 6 Company, Sappers and Miners.  
22nd Punjabis.  
57th Wilde's Rifles.  
53rd Sikhs.  
59th Seinde Rifles.  
No. 101 Native Field Hospital, A and B Section, No. 1 British Field Hospital.  
Telephone section.  
their place being taken by 1st Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, from Dand.

General Anderson to concentrate the force detailed in margin at Lakai on the afternoon of the 20th for operations expected to extend over a period of 5 days,—5 days' rations for men and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  days' grain for animals to be carried. On the same day the  $\frac{1}{2}$  Battalion 34th Pioneers left at Ghalanai were ordered up to Nahakki,

In accordance with these instructions the troops in Nahakki, with the exception of 1 section No. 8 Mountain Battery and 6 companies, 22nd Punjabis, who were left to hold the camp till the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, marched out at 6-15 A.M. towards Kasai, where they entered the bed of the Bohai Dag and turned towards Lakai. This circuitous route was adopted both in order to effect a junction more easily with the 57th Rifles, and also owing to the broken nature of the ground between Nahakki and Lakai.

As the advance-guard approached Kasai the hills on either side of the Darwazagai Pass were found to be held by small parties of the enemy, who, however, were easily driven off without loss. The hills were then piquetted, so as to cover the march of the main body down the Bohai Dag to Lakai, whilst one section No. 8 Mountain Battery and 4 companies, 59th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Carruthers were left at Kasai to ensure the junction of the 57th

Rifles from the 2nd Brigade, and the detachment left in Nahakki. At 10-30 A.M. the 57th Rifles reached Kasai and passed on towards Lakai, where the main body was then halted and all transport animals unloaded and watered. After a short rest a cavalry reconnaissance was pushed on towards Yakh Dand with orders to report on the nature of the line of advance, and on the water supply at Umra Kalai, where native reports showed the existence of at least one good tank. About noon the cavalry reported that they had reached Umra Kalai after some slight opposition, but that their further advance was barred by a body of about 200 of the enemy, who were occupying a small village about 150 yards north-east of Umra Kalai and the *band* of the tank, which was situated about 300 yards north-east of the small village, whence they kept up a desultory but accurate fire. An infantry covering party was then sent over to the north bank of the Bohai Dag, whilst the Sappers and Miners prepared two tracks out of the *nala* on to the table land to the north of it for the passage of the transport. When these were complete and the two detached forces had joined the main body at about 3 P.M., two sections No. 8 Mountain Battery, 53rd Sikhs and 57th Rifles were moved across the *nala* on to the high table land on the north bank, while the transport was loaded up, and moved down the *nala en masse* and formed up on a broad front behind the troops. By 4 P.M. all was ready for an advance, and the troops moved forward towards Umra Kalai. The force was now disposed as follows :—Front line, 57th Rifles on right, 4 guns No. 8 Mountain Battery in centre, 53rd Sikhs on left, covering a front of about 300 yards on each side of the track to Umra Kalai ; right flank guard, 2 guns No. 8 Mountain Battery with an infantry escort and 1 squadron, 21st Cavalry ; left flank guard 1 squadron, 21st Cavalry ; general reserve, in rear of centre, 59th Rifles and No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners. The massed baggage and supply columns followed the general reserve under escort of the 22nd Punjabis, which regiment also formed the rear-guard.

As the advance commenced the enemy fired a few shots from Umra Kalai village, wounding one of the brigade signallers, but made no serious attempt to hold the village, withdrawing rapidly to the north as the infantry advanced and disappearing into very broken ground.

Midway between the villages of Umra Kalai and Yakh Dand, situated about 2 or 2½ miles apart, is the large Yakh Dand Nala. The left bank of this *nala*, which runs west to east, lies close under the hills which divide the Utmanzai and Dawezai territory, whilst the right bank is joined by several very broken and precipitous tributary *nala*s, which with their network of innumerable feeders constitute an extremely broken and difficult piece of country, movement over which in formed bodies was almost impossible. Into this ground the enemy evidently purposely withdrew, for there he could be easily reinforced from Yakh Dand, and his local knowledge of tracks would be most valuable to him. As our advanced lines pushed on into this broken ground the action rapidly became hot, and casualties began to occur all along the line, but in spite of this the infantry forced their way up to the south bank of the main *nala*, and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, who withdrew up the northern bank into the hills and the broken ground round Yakh Dand : the guns meanwhile kept up a heavy fire and were most effective. The cavalry both on the right and left were also engaged with parties of the enemy who kept creeping up the *nala*s, and attempting to turn the flanks. The extreme right flank was therefore reinforced by No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners and the front line were ordered not to advance beyond the south bank of the big *nala*, but to make all preparations for an orderly retirement on Umra Kalai and a hamlet close by, where Sir James Willcocks had in the meantime decided to halt for the night. As the transport arrived the baggage was unloaded near the sites decided on for the bivouac of the corps to which it belonged, and an attempt made to water the mules at the tank. For this purpose the 59th Rifles were thrown into the fight at this point, and the 22nd Punjabis as they came up took their place as general reserve. The enemy were able, however, to keep up so heavy a fire on the tank from the network of *nala*s close to it, that after some six mules had been shot the attempt to water the animals was abandoned. It was now beginning to get dusk and every available man not in the firing line was utilized in preparing the perimeters of the two villages, while orders were despatched to the 53rd Sikhs and 57th Rifles to withdraw on camp, their retirement being assisted by parts of the 22nd Punjabis and 59th Rifles

respectively, while the guns, though much hampered by a blinding duststorm which made laying very difficult, rendered good support. As the withdrawal was carried out the enemy followed closely taking the fullest advantage of the intricate nature of the ground. Groups of *ghazis* could be seen suddenly appearing from *nala*s, and dashing sword in hand after our parties, only, however, to fall either by shell or rifle fire. Some very close fighting took place during this period of the fight : on the right where the 57th and 59th were hotly engaged, Lieutenant Archibald, 82nd Punjabis, attached to the 57th Rifles, was shot dead and the safe removal of his body only managed by the determined stand made by a small party of the regiment for the purpose. On the extreme left the 21st Cavalry, holding a village covering the flank, were hotly engaged at close quarters, and lost Lieutenant Soole killed, the removal of whose body in safety was only accomplished by a fine piece of work under close fire.

Darkness was now coming on, and as all the transport was in and the perimeters in a more or less forward condition the troops were withdrawn as quickly as circumstances permitted, and disposed in the two villages for the night, the enemy keeping up a hot but not very effective fire while the finishing touches were being put to the defences. The nature of the ground was such that had the troops not worked with great intelligence and made the fullest use of mutual support and covering fire our losses must have been much heavier than they were. Those of the enemy were heavy, considering the nature of the ground and their knowledge of all the available tracks. Our casualties between 6 A.M. on the 20th and 6 A.M. on the 21st were as follows :—

	Killed.	Wounded.
British officers	2	1
British soldiers	0	2
Native officers	1	1
Other native ranks	1	19
Horses	2	3
Mules	4	5

During the night a lamp message was sent to Nahakki asking for the despatch of a column to escort the wounded back to Nahakki in the morning, whilst the Seaforth Highlanders, one section 22nd

Mountain Battery and an ammunition column were ordered to join the 1st Brigade in the morning. Owing to the state of the Highlanders' shoes however, which were worn out by their hard marching in the Khaibar and Bohai Dag, the 55th Coke's Rifles were substituted for the Seaforths. Early in the morning the wounded were sent to Lakai, where the 1st Brigade escort handed them over to the troops from the 2nd brigade. The brigade then moved out of Umra Kalai at 9-45 A.M. and effected a junction with the reinforcements from Nahakki near the village of Hashim Kor.

The force then moved forward destroying some villages and towers *en route*, and although much delayed by the necessity for the construction of a track for the transport to cross a large *nala* which joins the main Yakh Dand Nala, arrived in camp at Habibzai (a hamlet of Kund Kuhai) without any interference from the enemy who seemed to have had enough on the previous day and were content with merely observing the march of the column and making demonstrations at the right flank guard. On arrival at Habibzai, however, a few of the enemy occupied some hills to the north-east of the village, and fired on the cavalry and, later on, the covering party while the perimeter was under construction, following them up when they withdrew to camp. In the course of the evening *jirgas* from the various sections of the Safis and the Mitai Musa Khel came into camp to arrange terms of submission.

The Musa Khel, influenced by their leading *malik* Ghairat Khan, accepted the terms imposed, but no agreement with the Safis was arrived at and their *jirga* left camp early next morning. That night firing into camp was heavy, but though the enemy appeared about to rush the camp at one time, accompanying their fire with much shouting, no attempt was made and very little damage done. Next morning a column composed of  $\frac{1}{2}$  squadron cavalry, 2 guns,  $\frac{1}{2}$  company Sappers and Miners, 22nd Punjabis and 59th Scinde Rifles was despatched at 5 A.M. under Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler with orders to burn the village of Bagh,—the summer residence of the Gud Mulla. The rest of the force marched for Lakarai a quarter of an hour later. As Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler's column advanced small parties of the enemy fired on the leading troops, and

on the left there was some sharp fighting, Captain O'Grady, 59t Rifles, being wounded. On reaching the Lakarai Kandao in front of Lakarai the heights on either side were found to be occupied by large numbers of the enemy, and it appeared as if a sharp action would take place, but, after a little firing and the capture of the outer low hills of the *kotal* by the advanced guard of Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler's force, the Safis held up the white flag, and decided to accept our terms, and the cease fire was accordingly sounded, though the other tribesmen continued to fire on our troops for some time, causing one or two casualties. They were, however, finally persuaded to retire by the two sections of Safis who had submitted, and the whole force then marched into Lakarai and settled down for the night. During the day's march a large number of villages and towers were destroyed.

As night fell, in spite of the fact that Lakarai was in the territory of the Safis who had just submitted, heavy firing into camp commenced, and was kept up for several hours causing 3 casualties amongst men and about 20 amongst the animals. On the 23rd a strong rear-guard was left under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fuller, with orders to destroy Lakarai prior to departure. This was carried out most judiciously, and the rear-guard got away successfully without giving the enemy a chance, though matters at one time looked threatening. The advanced guard left camp at 5-15 A.M. for Turu in the Dawezai country. During the march, which was unmolested, the village of Inzari on the left bank of the large Pipal Nala, and the village of Shakar Ghundai on the right bank with several others were destroyed. At Shato Khel—one of a group of villages lying along the right bank of the Pipal Nala to the north of Turu—the column halted for the night. In the afternoon 4 small parties were sent out to destroy the villages in the immediate vicinity and in the execution of this duty two or three casualties occurred. The force was separated up among several villages for the night, and there was as usual heavy firing into camp, especially at the most easterly village occupied, where some six mules were hit.

On the 24th the force marched to Had in the Ambahar valley. Orders were given for the various detachments to rendezvous in the main Pipal Nala close to a tank, where the animals were watered

before starting. Whilst moving to the point of assembly parties of the enemy followed up our troops, and subsequently engaged the rear-guard throughout the entire march to Kargha. Prior to departure some 5 or 6 more of the hamlets around Turu were destroyed.

The Pipal Nala down which the force now commenced to advance is dominated on the right bank by the high Sarlara range, which runs roughly from west to east, parallel to the stream, and throws out a spur to the north-east. This spur, which runs steeply down to the *nala*-bed at a point about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile west of Kargha, commands both the Pipal and Ambahar valleys.

Soon after the advance commenced information was gained by a cavalry reconnaissance that this spur was *sangared* and held by the enemy in considerable numbers, their position extending right across the Pipal valley immediately above its junction with the Ambahar, with their right and centre guarded by a network of *nalas* very similar to that in front of Yakh Dand. On receipt of this information Brigadier-General Anderson ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Fuller commanding the advance-guard to remain in observation of the enemy. Four companies of the 57th Rifles under Captain Ames, (52nd Sikhs, attached 57th Rifles), were then ordered to take 150 rounds per man on the person and filled water-bottles, and to ascend to the top of the Sarlara range, move along the crest and in due course down the big spur which formed the enemy's left. Meanwhile the rear-guard, composed of 1 field troop cavalry, 2 guns No. 8 Mountain Battery, and the 55th Rifles were engaged with some of the enemy who were trying to get within range of the main body and baggage in the bed of the *nala*, while the 22nd Punjabis, who had been bivouacked furthest from the main *nala* were, with the assistance of 2 guns sent back to them, covering the watering of their baggage animals prior to the start. As Captain Ames' column climbed the Sarlara it was opposed by some of the enemy, who hidden amongst the rocks near the crest were keeping up an ineffective fire on the column. Two guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery were then brought into action which cleared out this opposition and at length after a tremendous climb the 57th were seen on the crest line. Meanwhile the advance-guard had been halted some 2,000 yards in front of the enemy's position and had carefully refrained from opening the action, and the 2 sections

No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners had been busily employed in blowing up towers and villages.

As soon, however, as Captain Ames' column was seen moving along the crest line the main body was ordered to move up and join the advanced guard, keeping the baggage close together on a broad front in the *nala*-bed. When the main body gained touch, the remaining 4 companies 57th Rifles were sent up to the lower slopes of the big spur with orders to join hands with the column working down from the crest ; the 22nd Punjabis were told to prolong this line as far as the right bank of the Pipal Nala ; 4 companies 59th Rifles to hold a knoll on the left bank of the *nala* opposite the left of the 22nd Punjabis, mainly with their maxims, the companies being concentrated as a reserve. The ground between this knoll and a small mud walled enclosure on the edge of the broken country was held by the 53rd Sikhs with 2 guns of the 22nd Mountain Battery, whilst the 4 guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery were entrenched between the 53rd and 59th. In order to avoid becoming involved in the intricate mass of *nalas* in front of our left, orders were issued that the signal for the advance would be the opening of fire by the guns, which would not take place until the column on the high crest of the Sarlara began to work downwards, and that all troops on the left bank would hold their ground as a pivot while those on the right bank pushed forward against the enemy's left. The transport was massed under the high banks of the *nala* and the animals unloaded, and in due course the guns opened fire and the advance commenced. The enemy (who appeared for the most part to be armed with swords only) offered little resistance, and mostly retired either through the *nalas* towards their right, or back up the Ambahar valley. When the 57th Rifles and 22nd Punjabis reached the slopes overlooking Kargha they opened a heavy fire on the enemy, who were then in full flight, and the cavalry with the baggage column were ordered to push on down the *nala* and endeavour to get into the fugitives. This they successfully accomplished, sabreing some 20 to 30 of them in the open beyond Had village. Two guns from the rear-guard were also ordered up and came into action alongside the 22nd Punjabis on the right bank of the *nala*.

Meanwhile the transport was again loaded up, and the troops on the left bank of the *nala* were ordered to move forward carefully

over the broken country in front of the enemy's right, and as soon as they were in motion the transport was moved in solid mass down the bed of the *nala*. When nearing the bend of the *nala* round the big spur fire was suddenly opened on the transport from a couple of small buildings, which had been passed by the infantry in the advance, and one native driver was killed. As soon as the 22nd Punjabis from above, and 4 companies 59th Rifles who were with the baggage, saw what had happened they made a combined attack on the buildings, and No. 8 Mountain Battery fired a couple of shells into them at 600 yards. The attack was most successful: the 22nd Punjabis killing one man, and the 59th Rifles led by Lieutenant-Colonel Carruthers, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Anderson surrounding the remainder. Lieutenant Anderson led the storming party, and was himself the first man into the buildings. All the enemy, 5 in number, were either shot or bayoneted with the loss of only one sepoy, 59th Rifles, wounded.

After this episode the advance of the 53rd Sikhs on the left, and their capture of some of the enemy's *sangars* on that flank, dislodged a body of some two or three hundred of the enemy who were apparently lying in ambush in a *nala*. These fled up the steep hill on which the enemy's right had been *sangared*, where they came under the fire of all the guns and suffered heavy losses, whilst some of the 53rd Sikhs also started up the hill in pursuit.

As all opposition from in front now ceased the troops moved on to the bivouac selected near Had village, and commenced to settle down and entrench the perimeter. When the rear-guard however had nearly reached the place where the 5 *ghazis* had opened fire from the two buildings, they were suddenly opened on from the left bank of the *nala* by some of the enemy, who must either have remained hidden in the *nalas* and let the 53rd Sikhs pass over them, or else have crept back unseen when the 53rd had passed on. Four casualties occurred quickly at one spot, the removal of the wounded men being well carried out under the leadership of Captain Houston, 55th Rifles, who himself with one man went back for the havildar first wounded. This was the last fighting that day, though the camp was as usual fired into at night, but without much result. Our casualties on the 24th were slight, being 11 native rank and file wounded, one of whom subsequently died.

At 5-30 A.M. the following morning the force left Had and formed up in the *nala*-bed, where time was given for the mules to water, after which the force marched unopposed to the Kota Taraf Pass. The rear-guard however, which left camp at 7-10 A.M. after burning Had village, was followed up for a short distance by a few of the enemy, and one man of the 53rd Sikhs was wounded.

At 9 A.M. a column consisting of the 22nd Punjabis and 2 guns left the *nala* and proceeded to Gumbatai, the home of Mir Baz, which they destroyed. By 10 A.M. the force had arrived at the foot of the slope leading up to the Kota Taraf Pass, where the transport was split up into two columns, as there were two tracks leading to the pass itself.

At 12 noon the Gumbatai column rejoined the main body and by 2-10 P.M. the entire transport had crossed the pass. The force then moved into camp near Mulla Kalai on the banks of the Danish Kol, where water was very good and plentiful. The force had now arrived in Isa Khel territory, and as this clan had already sent in their submission, together with the Burhan Khel, to the Political Officer at Nahakki, no opposition was offered, and for the first time since leaving Dand the camp was not fired into at night. Additional rest was, moreover, afforded to the troops by the Isa Khel undertaking the duty of furnishing the outlying piquets for the camp.

Next day the brigade remained in camp at Mulla Kalai, where according to orders previously issued to General Barrett a convoy arrived from the 2nd Brigade at Nahakki, bringing provisions for the 1st Brigade during its return march *via* the Pandiali valley to Matta. The day was rendered very disagreeable by a bad dust-storm, which swept over the camp during the afternoon and lasted till late in the evening. The same day, as the *jirgas* of the Utmanzai and Dawezai had not yet complied with Government terms, Sir James Willcocks issued orders for the following action to be taken :—

The force at Nahakki, with the following troops from Mulla Kalai :—

1½ Squadrons 21st Cavalry  
2 Guns 28th Mountain Battery

22nd Punjabis  
55th Rifles

were to move against Yakh Dand, and thence, if necessary, over the Shatai Pass into Dawezai territory to ensure the full compliance on the part of the Utmanzai and Dawezai with Government terms. General Barrett was then to proceed to Koda Khel and, failing this section's submission, to inflict summary punishment on it, returning thence *via* the Khapak Pass to Ghalanai.

Meanwhile the remainder of the 1st Brigade were to remain halted for another day at Mulla Kalai, and then to return to Matta by the Pandiali route, executing the terms of punishment already agreed upon *en route*.

On the following morning General Barrett moved out of Mulla

Kalai, with troops as per margin, and marched along the Danish Kol towards Yakh Dand. On reaching Yakh Dand the force was met by a portion of the Utmanzai *jirga*, who stated that they were willing to pay the fine for the whole clan, and suggested that the houses of those who had been unwilling to submit should be destroyed. This was agreed to and carried out. The Dawezai *jirga*,  
 2 Squadrons, 21st Cavalry.  
 23rd Mountain Battery.  
 2 guns, 28th Mountain Battery.  
 Seaforth Highlanders.  
 28th Punjabis.  
 55th Rifles.  
 4 Companies, 22nd Punjabis.  
 Telephone section.  
 Joine / en route from Nahakki—  
 34th Pioneers.  
 No. 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.

who had apparently been observing the course of events from the neighbouring hill tops, arrived and begged to be allowed to make complete submission on the irreducible minimum of the terms originally offered them. This Sir James Willcocks, who had accompanied the force, also agreed to, and as there was now no need to proceed beyond Yakh Dand the force marched to Nahakki, and camped there for the night. A few shots were fired by the Utmanzai, who had refused to submit, as the rear-guard left Yakh Dand, but without result. Meanwhile General Anderson with his force, now reduced to 3 battalions infantry, 1 Mountain Battery and 1 Company Sappers and Miners remained at Mulla Kalai.

## CHAPTER X.

### *DESTRUCTION OF KODA KHEL BY 2ND BRIGADE, AND RETURN OF 1ST AND 2ND BRIGADES TO PESHAWAR.*

ALL the various clans who had risen against Government had now either submitted or suffered heavy punishment, with the single exception of the Koda Khel Baezai.

This clan, however, presuming on the fact that we had burnt Kung and yet not destroyed their own village, were now boasting that we did not dare to attack them. It was therefore necessary to make a second expedition up the Bohai Dag to chastise them after which the Mohmand Field Force could evacuate the enemy's country without any loss of prestige. Consequently on

\* 1½ Squadrons, 21st Cavalry.  
23rd Peshawar, Mountain  
Batteries.

2 guns, 28th Mountain Bat-  
tery.

1 Seaforth Highlanders.

½ Battalion, Guides Infantry.  
22nd Punjabis.

28th Punjabis.

½ Battalion, 34th Pioneers.  
54th Sikhs.

the morning of the 28th May the troops at Nahakki\* moved out at 5-30 A.M. for the old camp at Ata Jor, leaving only a small detachment of cavalry and the 55th Rifles to hold Nahakki. No opposition was offered and camp was reached without incident, where half battalion Guides Infantry, from Ghalanai,

and half battalion 34th Pioneers, joined the force. The latter, though starting from Nahakki, had marched to Ata Jor *via* the Nahakki and Khapak Passes and had spent the day improving the road for the return of the force to Ghalanai *via* the Khapak Pass.

On the 29th the force advanced to Koda Khel, leaving one company from each battalion and a half battalion, 22nd Punjabis, with two guns 23rd Mountain Battery to hold the camp, while a half battalion, 34th Pioneers, was also left to continue work on the track over the Khapak. As the force advanced the ridge to the left of the road south-east of the village of Kutai was occupied without opposition by two companies, 28th Punjabis, which were left with orders to remain there for the day, and cover the retirement of the rest of the force in the evening. On arriving opposite the village of Kutai the Seaforth Highlanders were detached from the column

with orders to move over the low hills beyond the village and occupy the ridge east of Koda Khel, and the 4 guns of the 23rd Mountain Battery came into position on the right flank of the Highlanders. The rest of the column followed the *nala*-bed as far as the entrance to the Koda Khel valley, from which point the Guides crossed the valley and commenced to climb the commanding hills west of the village covered by the fire of two guns 28th Mountain Battery, whilst the 54th Sikhs advanced along the *nala* east of the village and climbed the heights to the south. When this had been done the Pioneers and Sappers advanced direct on the village and commenced the work of destruction. Two companies 28th Punjabis meanwhile held a spur north of the ridge occupied by the Guides, and the reserves, consisting of a half battalion 22nd Punjabis and three companies 28th Punjabis, remained under cover in the valley below. The cavalry held the open plain to the north. A few of the enemy who tried to hold the village were quickly dislodged. Their main force however kept to the high ridges, where they opposed the advance of the Guides and the 54th, and finally withdrew to the watershed line near the Afghan boundary, from which they kept up a fire on our advanced posts throughout the day. At 12-30 p.m. when the villages had been completely destroyed, the force commenced to retire. As soon as our troops had left the villages, the 54th Sikhs began to withdraw from the heights above, with the enemy following closely. The Guides were the next to retire and were also followed up. The Seaforths were then ordered to hold on and form a pivot, until the rest of the force got clear of the Koda Khel valley, and then retire south-east through the low hills around Kutai. The enemy's fire soon slackened and the whole force reached camp at about 6 p.m. Our casualties during the day were Lieutenant W. Young, 67th Punjabis (attached 54th Sikhs), dangerously wounded, and 14 native rank and file wounded, the majority of these occurring during the withdrawal of the Guides and 54th Sikhs from the hills overlooking the village. During the night there was heavy firing into camp resulting in three casualties amongst the men, while nine mules and one camel were wounded.

Next day the force returned to Ghalanai. Early in the morning the Guides, 22nd Punjabis and 2 guns 28th Mountain Battery, were

sent on to hold the Khapak Pass and piquet the heights to Ghalanai, and the main body left camp at 9-30 A.M. when the piquets had taken up their positions. The road over the pass was found to be very easy especially on the west side, where the ascent is very gradual, and no check occurred for, to avoid blocking the pass, the camels were sent on in advance, the mule transport following an hour later.

On the withdrawal of the piquets from the pass after the column had passed through, the enemy opened fire from the pass, and two sepoys of the Guides were slightly wounded, but no attempt at following up was made. The march was a long one, and in spite of the fact that there was little opposition, it was 7 P.M. before the rear-guard reached Ghalanai, where a new camp had been prepared for the brigade by the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication. During the day, when the rear-guard of General Barrett's column passed the Nahakki Pass, the troops under Colonel Nicholls which had been left to hold Nahakki moved down and joined the main force in their retirement to Ghalanai. Shortly after reaching camp Lieutenant Young succumbed to his wounds, and was buried at 7 P.M. the same evening.

The objects of the expedition had now been accomplished and there only remained the retirement to Shabkadar to be carried out.

The force under Brigadier-General Anderson, which had remained halted on the 27th May at Mulla Kalai, had already reached Garhi Sadar, after a three days' march down the Pandiali valley, during which they carried out the terms of punishment imposed on the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel, and agreed upon by them at Nahakki.

On the 28th May the force left Mulla Kalai, and moving up the Garang Nala, crossed the Garang Pass, which had been reconnoitred and improved on the previous day.

This pass though very steep was in good order for mule transport and the entire baggage crossed in two hours, the force reaching camp at Lagham, 10 miles from Mulla Kalai, at 3-15 P.M. The next day was spent at Lagham, whilst a reconnaissance was carried out down the Bahu river towards the Swat, and the Sappers and Miners improved the road over the Burjina Pass for the following day.

Two demolition parties were also sent out, which destroyed four villages under the directions of the Political Officer with the force.

On the 30th the final stage into Garhi Sadar was completed, and the troops moved into a camp which had been arranged and pitched by the 3rd Brigade. The march of 9 miles from Lagham proved very difficult, especially a distance of 4 miles from the top of the Burjina Kotal, and the track would have been impossible for any but mule transport.

On the same day a portion of the 2nd Brigade marched to Hafiz Kor, the remainder, consisting of the Guides, 22nd Punjabis, 28th Punjabis, and 2 guns 28th Mountain Battery, following on the next day. This division of the force was carried out to avoid over-crowding the route. During the following days both brigades dispersed, units returning to their respective peace stations.

The expedition now ended had been most successful. All the tribesmen through whose territory the force had passed had submitted and paid the fines imposed on them, with the exception of the Kandahari Safis and the Koda Khel, and both of these latter had suffered severely. Further, the *jirgas* of the assured clans, *i.e.*, Pandiali Mohmands, Gandao Halimzai, and Kamali Halimzai and also of the Khwaizai, attended at Ghalanai before the force left that place, and informed the Political Officer of their intention to prevent any Baezai raiding party from passing through their territory. This promise was ratified in writing and signed by the leading *maliks*.

Our casualties from the commencement of the rising till the force left independent territory amounted to 52 killed (or died of wounds) and 205 wounded of all ranks; whilst those of the enemy were estimated at about 450 killed. Besides these casualties among men our force sustained the loss of 185 horses killed and wounded, a large proportion of which were hit in camp at night giving an idea of the amount of night firing done by the enemy.

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## APPENDIX I.

### *EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS, WITH RETURN OF CASUALTIES.*

Major-General Willcocks, after describing the operations of the force under his command, concludes his despatch as follows :—

I beg to bring to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the names of the following two officers and man for conspicuous gallantry in the field :—

Second-Lieutenant William Platt, 1st Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers.

Lieutenant Gerald Francis Waterworth, 1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

8221 Private Harry Lloyd, 1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

I recommend the following officers for a reward for their distinguished service in the field :—

*Staff*—Colonel W. R. Birdwood, C.I.E., A.D.C., Chief Staff Officer. An able and resourceful officer who never acknowledges difficulties and by his influence and tact secured the smooth working of the entire Staffs of the Force. He was always in the right place during a fight and rendered most valuable service throughout the operations.

Colonel A. W. Money, R.A., Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General. As in Zakka Khel, this officer did excellent work. He possesses great powers of organisation and thoroughly understands all the multifarious duties of a senior Staff Officer.

Lieutenant A. P. Y. Langhorne, R.A., Aide-de-Camp. I particularly bring this officer to notice for his coolness in action combined with his zeal and energy. He moreover possesses decided ability, and rendered me valuable aid in the field.

### STAFFS.

#### First Brigade.

- (i) Brigadier-General C. A. Anderson, C.B. An excellent soldier. Commanded the Column at Matta on 24th April and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. In every action in which his Brigade was engaged he did uniformly well and richly deserves a reward.
- (ii) Captain A. L. Tarver, 124th Baluchistan Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
- (iii) Captain E. E. Barwell, 57th Rifles, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

## Second Brigade.

(i) Major-General A. A. Barrett, C.B. Commanded his Brigade, and on several occasions mixed forces, with unqualified success. At Sur Dag on 18th May he drove the enemy from their positions without a check, and his retirement from Koda Khel was a fine sample of frontier warfare. I specially commend him to His Excellency's notice.

(ii) Major H. M. Allen, 25th Cavalry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General..

## REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.

## 1st Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Fowler . . . . .	22nd Punjabis.
Major S. H. Climo, D.S.O., 24th Punjabis . . . . .	
Lieutenant W. F. R. Webb . . . . .	53rd Sikhs.
Major P. J. Miles . . . . .	
, J. F. Finnis . . . . .	57th Rifles.
Major F. W. B. Gray . . . . .	
Captain C. G. Ames, 52nd Sikhs . . . . .	59th Rifles.
Lieutenant W. S. Trail . . . . .	
Captain and Adjutant R. S. Gordon . . . . .	54th Sikhs.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Carruthers . . . . .	
Lieutenant B. E. Anderson . . . . .	55th Rifles.
Captain H. deC. O'Grady . . . . .	

## 2nd Brigade.

Colonel W. E. Phillips . . . . .	28th Punjabis.
Captain M. R. Pocock . . . . .	
Major R. W. Falcon . . . . .	55th Rifles.
Captain A. M. Houston . . . . .	

## Divisional Troops.

Colonel G. B. Unwin . . . . .	21st Cavalry.
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel V. B. Fane . . . . .	
Captain F. A. Jackson . . . . .	
Captain and Adjutant O. M. Dyke . . . . .	
Major F. W. S. Stanton . . . . .	8th British Mountain Battery.
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Fuller . . . . .	28th Mountain Battery.
Captain J. R. E. Charles, D.S.O., R.E. . . . .	6th Co., Sappers and Miners.
Major G. E. L. Gilbert . . . . .	34th Pioneers.
Revd. Father Looman . . . . .	Roman Catholic Chaplain.

## Medical Services.

Major O. R. A. Julian, C.M.G., R.A.M.C.

## Supply and Transport.

Major C. H. G. Moore, D.S.O. . . . . Supply and Transport Corps.

Lieutenant E. H. Lancaster . . . . . 1st Mule Corps.

2nd-Lieutenant Kunwar Pirthi Singh . . . . . 51st Camel Corps.

## For distinguished service at Matta :—

Major P. T. Westmoreland . . . . . 1st Battalion, Royal

2nd-Lieutenant A. L. Hume-Spry (died of wounds) . . . . . } Warwick Regiment.

Major D. Sapte . . . . . 1st Battalion, Northumbrian Fusiliers.

## The undermentioned officers did exceptionally good work :—

Brigadier-General J. G. Ramsay, C.B.

Colonel H. R. Whitehead . . . . . R.A.M.C.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. C. Williams . . . . . Supply and Transport Corps.

„ „ A. R. Dick . . . . . 22nd Cavalry.

„ „ R. G. Strange . . . . . Royal Field Artillery.

„ „ G. R. Crawford . . . . . 40th Pathans.

Captain J. Woods . . . . . Indian Medical Service.

„ J. R. Broun . . . . . Khaibar Rifles.

„ H. Fawcett . . . . . 80th Field Battery, R. A.

Lieutenant L. V. Bond . . . . . Royal Engineers.

## The following non-commissioned officers and men specially distinguished themselves by gallantry in the field :—

9515 Private Edward Baines . . . . . 1st Battalion, Northumbrian Fusiliers.

8221 „ Joseph Peter Carruthers . . . . . }

6307 Sergeant Joseph Milledge . . . . . 1st Battalion, Royal

332 Lance-Corporal Walter Moore . . . . . Warwickshire Regiment.

832 Private Albert Stone . . . . .

I commend the undermentioned warrant and non-commissioned officers to His Excellency. They have been brought to notice for exceptionally good work—

Conductor H. G. Booth, Supply and Transport Corps.

Staff-Sergeant G. H. Sercombe, Telegraph Department.

Sergeant J. Elder, Supply and Transport Corps.

1st class Assistant Surgeon J. Lee, Indian Subordinate Medical Department.

My best thanks are due to Major Blakeway, Chief Political Officer with the Force, for his advice and assistance in all political matters. The valuable services rendered by him will be known to Government through the separate reports sent to the Foreign Department.

Captain W. J. Keen, Indian Army, who was Political Officer on the border before the formation of the Field Force, and was present at the action of Matta, did most useful work and much assisted us in our arrangements during those trying times.

I desire to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the following native officers for their gallantry and faithful service in the field. Seven thousand native troops were engaged in the fighting area and they have well upheld the high traditions of the Indian Army. The story of Jemadar Mir Afzal Khan, 22nd Punjabis, who was killed at Kasai, is in itself alone an episode which will live in frontier history :—

**21st Cavalry (Frontier Force).**

Risaldar-Major Janmeja Singh.

Ressaidar Thakur Singh.

**23rd Mountain Battery.**

Jemadar Fatta.

**19th Punjabis.**

Jemadar Jalal Khan (attached to 22nd Punjabis).

**20th Punjabis.**

Subadar Khwaja Muhammad.

**22nd Punjabis.**

Subadar-Major Kartar Singh.

Subadar Allah Nur.

Jemadar Mir Afzal Khan (killed).

**28th Punjabis.**

Subadar Mihan Singh.

Subadar Umraz Khan.

**34th Sikh Pioneers.**

Subadar-Major Narayan Singh.

Subadar Natha Singh.

**53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force).**

Subadar Sayyid Ali.

Jemadar Sarban Singh.

Jemadar Arsla Khan.

**54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).**

Subadar Dayal Singh.

**55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).**

Subadar-Major Zargun Shah, *Bahadur*.

## 57th Wilde's Rifles (Frontier Force).

Subadar-Major Bishn Singh.

Subadar Arsla Khan.

Hospital Assistant Kehr Singh.

## 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force).

Subadar-Major Ditt Singh.

Subadar Makhmad Jan.

Jemadar Jahan Dad Khan.

## Khyber Rifles.

Subadar-Major Jawas Khan.

Subadar Tor Khan.

## 50th Silladar Camel Corps.

Risaldar Nazir Mahomed.

Attached is a return of casualties.

I have, etc.,

JAMES WILLCOCKS, *Major-General,*  
*Commanding, Mohmand Field Force.*RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN ACTION, MOHMAND FIELD FORCE, FROM  
19TH APRIL TO 1ST JUNE 1908.

## Summary.

British officers.—4 killed, 3 died of wounds, 9 wounded, *nil* missing.Native Officers, }  
British and Native } 29 killed, 13 died of wounds, 177 wounded, *nil*  
N.-C. O.'s and men. } missing.Followers.—2 killed, 1 died of wounds, 19 wounded, *nil* missing.NOMINAL RETURN OF BRITISH OFFICERS KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS,  
WOUNDED AND MISSING.

## I.—Killed.

Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.	
Major . . .	N. C. MacLachlan, 1st Seaforth Highlanders.	Gunshot wound, head, accidental.	
Major . . .	H. Coape-Smith, 11th Lancers	Ditto	chest.
Lieutenant . .	G. H. Soole, 21st Cavalry .	Ditto	chest.
Lieutenant . .	G. F. Archibald, 82nd Punjabis (attached 57th Rifles).	Ditto	head.

## II.—Died of wounds.

Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.	
Lieutenant . . .	G. D. Martin, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Gunshot wound, thigh.	
Lieutenant . . .	W. Young, 67th Punjabis (attached 54th Sikhs).	Ditto	abdomen.
2nd-Lieutenant . . .	A. L. Hume-Spry, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Ditto	ditto.

## III.—Wounded.

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
Captain . . .	E. T. Rich, Royal Engineers	Slight . . .	Gunshot wound, left arm.	
Captain . . .	C. W. Wreford-Brown, D.S.O., 1st Northumberland Fusiliers.	Severe . . .	Ditto	thigh.
Lieutenant . . .	C. O. V. Gray, 1st Seaforth Highlanders.	Dangerous . . .	Ditto	chest.
Lieutenant . . .	H. T. C. Ivens, 26th Punjabis (attached 54th Sikhs).	Dangerous . . .	Ditto	do.
Lieutenant . . .	C. D. Campbell, 40th Pathans.	Severe . . .	Ditto	left thigh.
Lieutenant . . .	G. E. Bruce, 53rd Sikhs . . .	Slight . . .	Ditto	right arm.
Lieutenant . . .	S. J. B. Sparling, 57th Rifles	Slight . . .	Ditto	skull.
Captain . . .	R. F. Finlay, 58th Rifles (attached 57th Rifles).	Slight . . .	Ditto	left arm.
Captain . . .	H. deC. O'Grady, 59th Rifles.	Severe . . .	Ditto	left thigh and thumb.

IV.—Missing—*Nil.*

NOMINAL RETURN OF NATIVE OFFICERS, BRITISH AND NATIVE N. C. OS.  
AND MEN, KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS, WOUNDED AND MISSING.

## I.—Killed.

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name	Nature of wound.	
<i>British Troops.</i>				
9513	Private . .	S. H. Morris, 1st Northum- berland Fusiliers.	Gunshot wound, abdomen.	
893	„ . .	H. G. Rose, 1st Northumber- land Fusiliers.	Ditto	chest.
4107	Corporal . .	J. Satchwell, 1st Royal War- wick Regiment.	Ditto	chest, acci- dental.
9138	Private . .	W. Adams, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Ditto	abdomen.
9546	„ . .	J. White, 1st Seaforth High- landers.	Ditto	head, acci- dental.
<i>Native Troops.</i>				
2954	Sowar . .	Raj Mal, 19th Lancers . .	Gunshot wound, head.	
417	Sepoy . .	Farid Khan, 19th Punjabis .	Ditto	accidental.
3874	Bugler . .	Natha Singh, 21st Punjabis .	Ditto	ditto.
..	Jemadar .	Mir Afzal Khan, 22nd Punjabis	Ditto	head and chest.
3947	Lance-Havildar	Badan Singh	ditto	Ditto
3564	Naik . .	Narain Singh	ditto	Ditto
3874	„ . .	Mansa Singh	ditto	Ditto
4389	„ . .	Pir Bakhsh	ditto	Ditto
3966	Sepoy . .	Kirpa Singh	ditto	Ditto
3361	„ . .	Prem Singh	ditto	Ditto
3704	„ . .	Fazal Beg	ditto	Ditto
416	„ . .	Natha Singh	ditto	Ditto
263	„ . .	Shib Singh	ditto	Ditto
				chest.

I.—Killed—*contd.*

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.	
565	Naik . .	Nidhan Singh, 34th Pioneers .	Sword cuts, multiple.	
1262	Sepoy . .	Bhulla Singh ditto .	Ditto	ditto.
2329	„ . .	Ganda Singh ditto .	Ditto	ditto.
2381	„ . .	Sham Singh, 54th Sikhs, F. F.	Gunshot wound, abdomen.	
..	Jemadar .	Ganda Singh, 57th Rifles, F. F.	Ditto	chest.
2110	Sepoy . .	Amal Din ditto . .	Ditto	head.
1553	„ . .	Devi Singh ditto . .	Ditto	chest.
2148	„ . .	Suchet Singh ditto . .	Ditto	neck.
3021	„ . .	Abdulla ditto . .	Ditto	chest.
2371½	„ . .	Dost Muhammad ditto .	Ditto	do.
..	Subadar .	Fateh Singh, 59th Rifles .	Ditto	head.

## II.—Died of wounds.

<i>British Troops.</i>				
Nil.				
<i>Native Troops.</i>				
339	Lance-Naik .	Shafuddin, 8th Mountain Battery.	Gunshot wound, chest.	
2725	Trumpeter .	Rur Singh, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Ditto	head.
4713	Sepoy . .	Jawala Singh, 22nd Punjabis	Ditto	abdomen.
203	„ . .	Nur Muhammad, ditto .	Ditto	chest.
3449	„ . .	Nawab Ali, ditto .	Ditto	back and abdomen.
4712	„ . .	Punjab Singh, 28th Punjabis.	Ditto	head.
3801	„ . .	Kashmir Singh, 53rd Sikhs, F. F.	Ditto	do.
2443	.. . .	Labh Singh, 54th Sikhs, F. F.	Ditto	abdomen.

II.—Died of wounds—*contd.*

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.	
1846	Sepoy . .	Chand Khan, 55th Rifles, F. F.	Gunshot wound, chest.	
2364	„ . .	Wazir Singh, 57th Rifles, F. F.	Ditto	abdomen.
2243	„ . .	Kharku, ditto . .	Ditto	ditto.
4427	„ . .	Asghar Khan, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Ditto	chest.
4277	„ . .	Bahadur Singh, ditto . .	Ditto	left thigh.

## III.—Wounded.

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
<i>British Troops.</i>					
25889	Gunner . .	H. Price, 8th Moun- tain Battery, R. G. A.	Dangerous.	Gunshot wound, leg.	
21131	„ . .	G. H. Colenutt, 71st Company, R. G. A.	Slight .	Ditto	right fore-arm.
794	Sergeant . .	H. Morgan, 80th Battery, R. F. A.	Severe .	Ditto	left shoulder.
5199	Colour-Sergeant	A. Pearce, 1st Northumberland Fusiliers.	Slight .	Ditto	right arm.
9295	Sergeant . .	W. H. S. Blades, 1st Northumber- land Fusiliers.	„	Ditto	chin.
7805	Private . .	W. Dewse, 1st Northumberla n d Fusiliers.	Severe	Ditto	both thighs and wrist.
332	Lance-Corporal.	W. Moore, 1st Royal Warwick Regi- ment.	Dangerous.	Ditto	abdomen.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
9134	Private . . .	A. Pickard, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Slight . .	Gunshot wound, arm.	
426	" . .	B. Wincup, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Severe . .	Ditto	left thigh.
6731	" . .	C. Gould, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	do.
316	" . .	J. Gurney, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	left foot.
9101	" . .	H. Lloyd, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	chest.
11	" . .	H. Nixon, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	left arm.
34	" . .	G. West, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	right foot.
832	" . .	A. Stone, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Fracture, right thigh.	
277	" . .	D. Gregory, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Slight . .	Gunshot wound, right shoulder.	
7774	" . .	O. Oliver, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	right arm.
8136	" . .	A. Jay, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	right ear.
4921	" . .	J. Spiers, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	," . .	Ditto	ditto.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
8953	Private . . .	A. Muir, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment.	Severe . .	Gunshot wound, left fore-arm, accidental.	
6535	„ . .	H. Homer, 1st Seaforth Highlanders.	„ . .	Ditto	left lower extremity.
9548	„ . .	H. King, 1st Seaforth Highlanders.	Slight . .	Ditto	back.
9145	„ . .	A. Bain, 1st Seaforth Highlanders.	Dangerous . .	Ditto	neck.
5736	Colour-Sergeant	J. Brown, 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers.	Severe . .	Ditto	right arm.
6582	Private . . .	T. Carroll, 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers.	Slight . .	Ditto	do.
6938	. . .	E. Lynch, 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers.	Severe . .	Ditto	left arm.
		<i>Native Troops.</i>			
2485	Sowar . . .	Gulab Singh, 19th Lancers.	Severe . .	Gunshot wound, mouth.	
..	Dafadar . . .	Kirpal Singh, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Slight . .	Wound, right finger due to explosion of gunpowder.	
2544	Naik . . .	Tulsi Das, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Severe . .	Gunshot wound, forearm.	
{ 3080	Sowar . . .	Santok Singh, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Slight . .	Sabre wound, foot.	
3310	„ . . .	Abdul Masjid Khan, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	„ . .	Gunshot wound, leg.	
3211	„ . . .	Chanan Singh, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Severe . .	Ditto	left thigh.
3292	„ . . .	Khadamali, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Slight . .	Ditto	head.
3357	„ . . .	Murtaza Khan, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	„ . .	Ditto	do.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
2947	Sowar . . .	Wali Jan, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Severe . .	Fracture, clavicle left (fall from horse).	
3119	„ . .	Amar Singh, 21st Cavalry, F. F.	Slight . .	Gunshot wound (region not given).	
59	Gunner . . .	Mohanda Khan, 23rd Mountain Battery.	„ . .	Ditto	head.
5185	Sepoy . . .	Amir Husain, Guides Infantry.	Severe . .	Ditto	leg.
4268	Lance-Naik . .	Ismail Khan, Guides Infantry.	„ . .	Ditto	do.
4925	Sepoy . . .	Jamal Din, Guides Infantry.	„ . .	Ditto	thigh.
5211	„ . .	Dawar Khan, Guides Infantry.	„ . .	Ditto	forearm.
4972	„ . .	Bishan Singh, Guides Infantry.	„ . .	Ditto	both legs.
4944	„ . .	Zari Gul, Guides Infantry.	„ . .	Ditto	calf.
3531	Havildar . .	Sandhu Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Slight . .	Ditto	head.
3557	„ . .	Chanda Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	„ . .	Ditto	do.
1501	Sepoy . . .	Chanda Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Severe . .	Ditto	forearm.
3707	Lance-Naik . .	Hari Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Slight . .	Ditto	head.
234	Sepoy . . .	Dalip Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Severe . .	Ditto	left arm.
4947	Havildar . . .	Jehandad, 22nd Punjabis.	Slight . .	Ditto	face.
4046	Sepoy . . .	Basant Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Dangerous . .	Ditto	do.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Designa-tion of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
3905	Naik . .	Badawa Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Slight .	Gunshot wound, leg.	
244	Sepoy . .	Sharif Khan, 22nd Punjabis.	Severe .	Ditto	neck.
4284	Lance-Naik .	Kale Khan, 22nd Punjabis.	Slight .	Ditto	head.
4780	Sepoy . .	Ram Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	do.
4931	Lance-Naik .	Surain Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	arm.
357	Sepoy . .	Fateh Khan, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	nose.
236	„ . .	Wazir Khan, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	foot.
4285	„ . .	Hasan Muhammad, 22nd Punjabis.	Severe .	Ditto	left shoulder.
349	„ . .	Hetam Khan, 22nd Punjabis.	Slight .	Ditto	back.
229	„ . .	Dewan Ali, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	right thumb.
4718	„ . .	Lal Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	shin.
4988	„ . .	Injur Gul, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	left hand.
91	„ . .	Nagina Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	Severe .	Ditto	right leg.
316	„ . .	Indar Singh, 22nd Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	neck.
71	„ . .	Nand Singh, 28th Punjabis.	„ .	Ditto	both thighs.
4422	„ . .	Karm Singh, 28th Punjabis.	Dangerous.	Ditto	head.
395	„ . .	Tota, 28th Punjabis	Slight .	Ditto	shoulder.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
3924	Lance-Naik .	Uttam Singh, 28th Punjabis.	Severe .	Gunshot wound, leg.	
123	Sepoy . .	Tarlok Singh, 28th Punjabis.	Dangerous.	Ditto	head, with wound of brain.
87	„ . .	Zugir, 28th Punjabis.	Severe .	Ditto	left knee.
1974	„ . .	Saudagar Singh, 34th Pioneers.	Slight .	Ditto	right arm.
773	„ . .	Ram Singh, 34th Pioneers.	Severe .	Ditto	leg.
2535	„ . .	Natha Singh, 34th Pioneers.	„ .	Ditto	do.
3701	„ . .	Ganda Singh, 40th Pathans.	Slight .	Ditto	forehead.
..	Subadar .	Said Ali, 53rd Sikhs, F. F.	Severe .	Ditto	right shoulder.
1791	Havildar .	Tara Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	left leg.
2130	„ . .	Gul Akhmad, do.	„ .	Ditto	head.
3007	Naik . .	Lal Khan, do.	Slight .	Ditto	right up- per arm.
2345	Lance-Naik .	Afzal Khan, do.	Dangerous.	Ditto	chest.
3426	Sepoy . .	Sohan Singh, do.	Severe .	Ditto	left wrist.
3715	„ . .	Nur Khan, do.	„ .	Ditto	left knee, accidental.
3315	„ . .	Kehr Singh, do.	Slight .	Ditto	right fore-arm.
3591	„ . .	Amar Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	left thigh.
3514	„ . .	Nangu Khan, do.	Dangerous.	Ditto	chest.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Designation of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
3551	Sepoy . . .	Sikandar Khan, 53rd Sikhs, F. F.	Slight . .	Gunshot wound, right ankle.	
3526	„ . . .	Gurdit Singh, do.	Severe . .	Ditto	lower jaw.
1001	Havildar . . .	Galardo, 54th Sikhs, F. F.	Slight . .	Ditto	head.
1312	„ . . .	Hashmat Ali, do.	Dangerous.	Ditto	left thigh.
997	Naik . . .	Thaman Singh, do.	Severe . .	Ditto	right thigh.
2699	Sepoy . . .	Kadir Khan, do.	, . .	Ditto	chest.
2603	„ . . .	Makan Singh, do.	, . .	Ditto	left fore-arm.
2315	„ . . .	Jawala Singh, do.	Dangerous.	Ditto	ditto.
2499	„ . . .	Jagat Singh, (1st) do.	Severe . .	Ditto	ditto.
2543	„ . . .	Jagat Singh, (2nd) do.	, . .	Ditto	finger.
2597	„ . . .	Bishn Singh, do.	, . .	Ditto	do.
2592	„ . . .	Makan Singh, do.	Dangerous.	Ditto	do.
2533	„ . . .	Bukht Jamal, do.	, . .	Ditto	right leg.
1993	„ . . .	Badhawa Singh do.	, . .	Ditto	lung and liver.
2245	„ . . .	Partab Singh, do.	Slight . .	Ditto	face.
984	„ . . .	Bhawal Bakhsh, do.	, . .	Ditto	head.
2023	„ . . .	Jai Dayal, do.	, . .	Ditto	right fore-arm.
2598	„ . . .	Hira Singh, do.	, . .	Ditto	left wrist.
2238	„ . . .	Punjab Singh, do.	, . .	Ditto	face.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
..	Subadar-Major.	Zargun Shah, <i>Ba-hadur</i> , 55th Rifles, F. F.	Slight .	Bullet bruise, abdomen.	
172	Havildar .	Kishun Singh, do.	Dangerous .	Ditto	chest.
836	„ . .	Mir Dost, do.	Severe .	Gunshot wound, right thigh.	
1300	Lance-Naik .	Basant Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	right leg.
1756	Bugler . .	Dan Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	finger.
1473	Sepoy . .	Dasonda Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	right leg.
1117	„ . .	Bahadur, do.	Slight .	Ditto	left knee.
2056	„ . .	Abdul Kalim, do.	Severe .	Ditto	foot.
1690	„ . .	Mir Ahmad, do.	Slight .	Ditto	both arms and chin.
1141	„ . .	Hari Singh, do.	Severe .	Ditto	right fore-arm.
1566	„ . .	Phandi, do.	Dangerous .	Ditto	left leg.
1752	„ . .	Mangal Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	right thigh.
2053	„ . .	Ishar Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	left knee.
2109	„ . .	Nur Mir, do.	Slight .	Bullet bruise, left arm.	
969	„ . .	Firoz Khan, do.	„ .	Gunshot wound, head.	
..	Jemadar .	Bhagat Singh, 57th Rifles, F. F.	Severe .	Ditto	right thigh and hand.
928	Havildar .	Gujar Singh, do.	„ .	Ditto	left thigh.

III.—Wounded—*n*contd.

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
11551	Havildar	Sherulla, 57th Rifles, F.F.	Slight	Gunshot wound, left hand.	
1613	„	Bahawal Khan, do.	Severe	Ditto	left leg.
1739	„	Muzaffar Khan, do.	Slight	Ditto	ditto.
1964	Lance-Naik	Dewa Singh do.	„	Ditto	right shoulder.
1953	„	Drab Khan, do.	Severe	Ditto	left thigh.
2068	„	Ahmad Khan, do.	„	Ditto	right wrist.
2172	„	Salim Khan, do.	„	Ditto	left eye.
1958	„	Shibdaial Singh, do.	Slight	Ditto	right thigh.
1628	„	Sidhu, do.	„	Ditto	ditto.
2134	„	Muhammad Khan, do.	Severe	Ditto	right fore-arm.
1455	„	Sarandaz, do.	Dangerous.	Ditto	neck.
2748	Sepoy	Sharlat Khan, do.	Slight	Contusion, right knee.	
2943	„	Batan Singh, do.	Severe	Gunshot wound, right knee.	
1772	„	Das, do.	„	Ditto	right thigh.
1995	„	Malla Singh, do.	„	Ditto	chest.
2723	„	Kashim Khan, do.	Slight	Ditto	left fore- arm.
2600	„	Hazrat Mir, do.	Severe	Ditto	right groin.
2612	„	Bhan Singh, do.	„	Ditto	right hand.
2113	„	Mula Singh, do.	„	Ditto	left hand.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
2014	Sepoy . .	Birju, 57th Rifles, F. F.	Slight .	Gunshot wound, abdomen.	
2436	" . .	Bakar Khan, do.	Severe .	Ditto	left wrist.
2587	" . .	Gayan Singh, do.	Slight .	Ditto	right arm.
1731	" . .	Bir Singh, do.	" .	Ditto	right foot.
2577	" . .	Mir Zaman, do.	Severe .	Ditto	left hand.
2910	" . .	Farman Ali, do.	" .	Ditto	right foot.
2986	" . .	Zaman Ali, do.	" .	Ditto	left hand.
2947	" . .	Fateh Muham- mad, do.	" .	Ditto	right thigh.
2158	" . .	Bakhtawar Khan, do.	Slight .	Ditto	right fore-arm.
2679	" . .	Khoasta Khan, do.	" .	Ditto	right shoulder.
2323	" . .	Hamid Gul, do.	Dangerous	Ditto	head.
..	Subadar .	Muhammad Khan, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Slight .	Ditto	scalp.
..	Jemadar .	Jahandad Khan, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Severe .	Ditto	right ankle.
2960	Havildar .	Bal Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	" .	Ditto	right shoulder.
3085	" . .	Bukkan Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	" .	Ditto	left leg.
3245	" . .	Sultan Ali, 59th Rifles, F. F.	" .	Ditto	ditto.
4230	Sepoy . .	Amar Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	" .	Ditto	right knee.

III.--Wounded--*contd.*

Regi- men-tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
4442	Sepoy . . .	Kaka Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Severe	Gunshot wound, left shoulder.	
3843	" . .	Bishan Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	left thigh.
4367	" . .	Jawar Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	right leg.
4475	" . .	Gurmukh Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	chest.
4174	" . .	Gul Nur, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Dangerous.	Ditto	mouth.
4288	" . .	Ghulam Jan, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Slight .	Ditto	left leg.
4142	" . .	Tara Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	left arm.
3249	" . .	Shadman Khan 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	leg.
3759	" . .	Nathu, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Severe .	Ditto	right foot.
4229	" . .	Lahena Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	left fore arm.
4100	" . .	Lall Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	both thighs.
4135	" . .	Feroze Khan, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	left hand.
4394	" . .	Mirza Khan, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	left thigh.
4029	" . .	Saif Ullah, 59th Rifles, F. F.	," .	Ditto	
4362	" . .	Habab Shah, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Slight .	Wound, sclap.	
4541	" . .	Sarfraz, 59th Rifles, F. F.	Severe .	Ditto.	

III.—Wounded—*concl.*

Regi- men- tal No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
4337	Sepoy	Jan Gul, 59th Ri- fles, F. F.	Severe	Gunshot wound, right leg.	
4212	„	Jumma Khan, 59th Rifles, F.F.	„	Ditto	chest and left arm.
3605	„	Mayya Singh, 59th Rifles, F.F.	„	Ditto	head and left thumb.
405	„	Yar Mast, Khaibar Rifles.	Dangerous.	Ditto	left thigh.
1181	„	Baranai, Khaibar Rifles.	Slight	Ditto	right cheek.]

IV.—Missing—*Nil.*NOMINAL RETURN OF FOLLOWERS, KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS, WOUNDED,  
AND MISSING.

## I.—Killed.

Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
Driver	Ghulam Muhammad, 28th Mule Corps.	Sword cuts.
„	Feroz, 29th Mule Corps	Gunshot wound, head.

## II.—Died of wounds.

Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
Driver	Ata Muhammad, 7th Mule Corps.	Gunshot wound, abdomen.

## III.—Wounded.

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.	
Mistri . .	Khan Mir, 1st Mule Corps .	Slight .	Gunshot wound, neck.	
Driver . .	Ali Akbar, ditto .	„ .	Ditto	fore-head.
Lohar . .	Khan Mir, ditto .	Dangerous.	Ditto	neck.
Driver . .	Niaz Khan, ditto .	Slight .	Ditto	left leg.
Lance-Naik . .	Raja, 6th Mule Corps . .	„ .	Ditto	left shin.
Syce . .	Diwan, ditto . .	Severe .	Ditto	left thigh.
Driver . .	Fazal Dad, 7th Mule Corps .	„ .	Ditto	chest.
„ . .	Mad Gul, ditto .	Slight .	Ditto	left arm.
Lance Naik .	Halim Gul, 28th Mule Corps .	„ .	Ditto	toe, right-foot.
Syce . .	Ram Sahai, 19th Lancers .	Severe .	Ditto	left leg.
„ . .	Manohar, ditto .	„ .	Wound, left leg, crushed by horse.	
„ . .	Sowali Khan, 55th Rifles, F. F.	Slight .	Gunshot wound, nose.	
„ . .	Ram Lal, <sup>13th</sup> ditto .	„ .	Ditto	left ankle.
Bearer . .	Abdul Ghafoor, Army Bearer Corps.	Severe .	Ditto	left thigh.
„ . .	Akka, Army Bearer Corps .	Dangerous.	Ditto	head.
..	Shamas-ud-din, 12th Survey Party.	Slight .	Ditto	left foot.
Private Servant	Abdul Ghafur, 1st Seaforth Highlanders.	Severe .	Ditto	left thigh.

III.—Wounded—*contd.*

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound— dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.
Private Syce .	Ram Lal, 22nd Punjabis .	Severe .	Gunshot wound, left foot.
Grass-cutter .	Umra, 21st Cavalry, F. F. .	Slight .	Ditto (region not given).

IV.—Missing—*Nil.*

H. R. WHITEHEAD, *Colonel,*  
*Principal Medical Officer, Mohmand Field Force.*

JAMES WILLCOCKS, *Major-General,*  
*Commanding Mohmand Field Force.*

LESHPAWAR ;

19th June 1908.

## APPENDIX II.

### STAFF OF MOHAMAND FIELD FORCE.

#### Field Force Staff.

General Officer Commanding . . . . .	Major-General Sir James Wilcocks K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.
Aide-de-Camp . . . . .	Lieutenant A. P. Y. Langhorne, R.A.
Extra Aide-de-Camp . . . . .	Subadar Khwaja Muhammad Khan.
Orderly Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant J. M. Blair, Royal Highlanders.
Chief Staff Officer . . . . .	Colonel W. R. Birdwood, A.-D.-C., C.I.E.
Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.	Colonel A. W. Money, R.A.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Press Censor.	Major A. W. F. Baird, Gordon Highlanders.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General .	Captain A. G. Stuart, 40th Pathans.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (for Intelligence).	Captain G. R. Trotter, 56th Rifles, F. F.

#### Attached to Field Force Staff.

Commanding Royal Engineer . . . . .	Colonel J. E. Dickie, R.E.
Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer .	Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Dundee, R.E.
Principal Medical Officer . . . . .	Colonel H. R. Whitehead, R.A.M.C.
Senior Veterinary Officer . . . . .	Major A. England, A.V.C.
Divisional Supply Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. C. Williams, Supply and Transport Corps.
Divisional Transport Officer . . . . .	Major A. Mullaly, Supply and Transport Corps.
Field Treasure Chest Officer and Provost Marshal.	Captain C. Fitz H. Lance, 19th Lancers.
Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Officer.	Lieutenant H. B. Wood, Supply and Transport Corps.
Divisional Troops Signalling Officer . . .	Captain M. G. Heath, The Queen's.
Assistant Signalling Officers . . . . .	{ Lieutenant F. Curtis, 19th Lancers. Lieutenant T. S. Paterson, 19th Lancers.
Survey Officer . . . . .	Captain E. Rich, R.E.

#### 1st Brigade Staff.

General Officer Commanding . . . . .	Brigadier-General C. A. Anderson, C.B.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General . . .	Captain A. L. Tarver, 124th Baluchistan Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General .	Captain E. Barwell, 57th Rifles, F. F.
Orderly Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant J. A. H. Bannerman, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

## Attached to 1st Brigade Staff.

Provost Marshal . . . . .	Captain H. N. Holden, 5th Cavalry.
Brigade Supply Officer . . . . .	Major M. R. James, Supply and Transport Corps.
Brigade Signalling Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant W. Gibson, Northumberland Fusiliers.

## 2nd Brigade Staff.

General Officer Commanding . . . . .	Major-General A. A. Barrett, C.B.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General . . . . .	Major H. M. Allen, 25th Cavalry, F. F.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General . . . . .	Captain J. Bruce, R.A.
Orderly Officer . . . . .	Captain D. A. D. McVean, 45th Sikhs.

## Attached to 2nd Brigade Staff.

Provost Marshal . . . . .	Captain H. J. P. Browne, 5th Gurkha Rifles, F. F.
Brigade Supply Officer . . . . .	Captain A. H. Babington, Supply and Transport Corps.
Brigade Signalling Officer . . . . .	Captain C. B. Chamley, Seaforth Highlanders.

## 3rd Brigade Staff.

General Officer Commanding . . . . .	Brigadier-General J. G. Ramsay, C.B.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General . . . . .	Major A. I. R. Glasfurd, 97th Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General . . . . .	Captain W. H. Beach, R.E.
Orderly Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant H. J. Boyd, 13th Lancers.

## Attached to 3rd Brigade Staff.

Brigade Supply Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant W. H. B. Salmon, Supply and Transport Corps.
Brigade Signalling Officer . . . . .	Lieutenant H. C. O'Brien, Royal Munster Fusiliers.

## Line of Communication Staff.

General Officer Commanding, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, and Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, of 3rd Brigade in addition to other duties.	
Chief Supply Officer . . . . .	Major G. L. Saunders, Supply and Transport Corps.
Chief Transport Officer . . . . .	Major W. L. Amesbury, Supply and Transport Corps.
Section Commandant . . . . .	Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Strange, R.F.A.
Field Engineer . . . . .	Major Ewbank, R.E.

## Base Staff.

Base Commandant . . . . .	Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Dick, 22nd Cavalry, F. F.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General . . . . .	Major A. S. Hamilton, 52nd Sikhs, F. F.

Senior Medical Officer	.	.	.	Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Nicholls, R.A.M.C.
Officer Commanding British Base Depôt	.	.	.	Captain W. G. R. Farmar, R.A.
Officer Commanding Native Base Depôt	.	.	.	Captain C. J. White, 53rd Sikhs, F. F.
Base Ordnance Officer	.	.	.	Captain H. Clarke, R.A.
„ Supply	„	.	.	Major E. G. Vaughan, Supply and Transport Corps.
„ Transport	„	.	.	Major J. S. Swan, Supply and Transport Corps.
Railway Staff Officer	.	.	.	Captain H. J. P. Browne, 5th Gurkha Rifles, F. F. (prior and subsequent to his employment as Provost Marshal, 2nd Brigade).

## APPENDIX III.

### *EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON ENGINEER OPERATIONS, MOHMAND FIELD FORCE, 1908.*

Although sanction to cross the Mohmand border was only received on the 10th May 1908 engineering preparations for military operations had been put in hand on the 18th April. On the 21st, an attack was made on the post at the Adezai bridge which had been previously put into a state of defence. The attacks on Garhi Sadar and Matta also found these posts entrenched and with barbed wire obstacles, which proved most effective. The perimeter of the camp by Shankargarh Fort had also been made defensible. The 6th Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, had been employed on this work which also included water-supply arrangements, filtration wells close to the water channels, which were found to answer satisfactorily.

2. Work on the lines of communication, Peshawar-Shankargarh and Peshawar-Michni as well as Mardan-Shankargarh, had also been put in hand, and the boat bridges covered by detachments protected by entrenchments and obstacles. The ferries at Khiali, Abazai and Michni were also reconstructed and the hemp ropes replaced by wire hawsers, the boats being worked across by means of "travellers" instead of the old arrangement of warping across. The 2nd Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, under Captain Tylden-Pattenson, R.E., had taken the place of No. 6 Company in the Khaibar movable column and been employed on the Michni crossing.

3. Captain J. Charles, D.S.O., took over command of the 6th Company from Lieutenant A. J. G. Bird on the 27th April 1908 and Captain A. H. Cunningham, R.E., with No. 1 Company, Sappers and Miners, joined the field force at Shabkadar on the 30th April.

4. Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Dundee, C.I.E., R.E., Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer, joined the Peshawar Infantry Brigade at Matta Mughal Khel on the 20th April and continued the direct supervision of preparations for a possible advance. Meanwhile, at the advanced base at Shankargarh, tools, explosives and materials for barbed wire entanglement were collected and arranged in mule loads.

5. A base hospital had been equipped in Shankargarh Fort and a hospital rest-camp at Daudzai inside the *thana*.

6. No engineering work was required during the short period of hostilities in the Khaibar, beyond fixing up water standards at Jamrud. At Landi Kotal the existing water-supply was found sufficient for requirements and at Ali Masjid the stream was drawn on from the same place as during the Zakka Khel expedition.

7. The divisional camp which was formed on the Shankargarh-Michni road near Shabkadar village was protected by an entrenched perimeter and water was obtained from the bed of the Gandao stream, then almost dry, shallow

filtration wells being dug, revetted with boulders, and pumps used for filling *pakhals* and drinking troughs.\* The drinking water was carefully fenced in with barbed wire and was of course above the places used for watering animals and for washing, a water guard securing the observance of orders. Incinators were constructed, log bridges made over wet *nalas* and camp roads and approaches made.

8. On the 12th May No. 1 Company marched with the 2nd Brigade to Hafiz Kor and there took in hand the water-supply, and also works on the road towards Dand, into which on the 14th, after the departure of the 1st Brigade from Dand the same day, a new approach road 300 yards long was made into camp. On the 13th, the 6th Company, Sappers and Miners, and the 34th Pioneers were employed on the road leading to and also beyond Dand. By the 16th May the 2nd Brigade had joined the 1st Brigade at Nahakki having brought all their camels over the Karappa and Nahakki passes which had been made practicable by the 2 Companies of Sappers and the 34th Pioneers. Part of the work both in the Karappa and Nahakki passes was very heavy and necessitated the liberal expenditure of explosives. Remarkably little trace was found of the road used in 1897, the work, having been doubtless chiefly "building up," had gradually got knocked down and fallen away under the action of traffic and weather.

9. Both at Dand and Ghalanai water was obtained from the Gandao stream, pumps being used to fill *pakhals* and troughs. The same arrangements were made as at Hafiz Kor.

10. At Nahakki where General Sir James Willcocks, who accompanied the flying column under Brigadier-General Anderson, arrived on the afternoon of the 14th May, the only known water-supply was a large tank near the village. This tank which was then  $5\frac{1}{2}$  feet deep in the middle and computed to contain from 130,000 to 150,000 gallons of water, was at once protected as usual and water drawn by pumps and delivered into *pakhals* and drinking troughs, the latter made of canvas and paulins. When there was a crush of animals, as on the arrival of a convoy, it was found necessary to fill troughs by gravity, a small channel being dug for the purpose. This however was resorted to only when unavoidable as it was most desirable to prevent water being drawn by dipping, vessels used for which could not be guaranteed as clean.

11. Shortly after the arrival of the force at Nahakki it was brought to notice by Subadar Khwaja Muhammad Khan, who had been with General Sir Edmond Elles in 1897, that there was a spring in a gorge near Sro village. This was inspected on the 16th and proved to be an excellent potable water, yielding about 120 gallons an hour or say 10,000 gallons during the time it was possible to use it daily. On the 17th a pump was put in, and work was started

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\* Note by Sir James Willcocks.—The use of pumps generally was the salvation of the force from a water, and hence, from a sanitary, point of view I strongly recommend that they form a part of engineer equipment to be maintained at the base of any expedition during summer months, or in a country where the water has to be obtained from tanks.

to make a good mule road between the spring and the camp, a distance of about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles. On the 23rd instant a second spring in the gorge just beyond No. 3 picket was reported, the ravine was nearer than the one near Sro but the water was higher up. A pump was placed in the spring and mule tracks constructed as in the case of Sro spring. From this moment there was little anxiety about the water-supply and the tank was used more freely for watering animals, which had been sent whenever possible to other small tanks in the vicinity under a strong guard. These tanks however had gradually become exhausted and the level of the Nahakki tank had dropped from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  feet on the 15th to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet on the 29th so that by that date about  $\frac{1}{5}$  of the contents or say 30,000 gallons alone remained, and of that amount probably  $\frac{1}{2}$  would have proved undrinkable. The tank however had under careful supervision served its purpose and the last troops left Nahakki on the 30th May. At one time there were in camp 2,500 mules and 700 camels; if these had been given the full allowance of 7 and 10 gallons respectively or say 24,500 gallons in all it will be seen that the tank only contained originally sufficient for just one week. Nahakki was occupied for 16 days.

12. If therefore the springs had not been discovered and every effort made to regulate the distribution of the water-supply, it is evident that Nahakki could not have remained for that period a central advanced base from which operations could be carried out. Moreover, without a sufficient number of pumps the distribution of water would have been impossible.

13. The pumps used were of two kinds, *viz.* :—

- (1) Wilcox semi-rotary lift and force No. 5— $1\frac{1}{4}$ ".
- (2) Double barrel aluminium lift and force pump—3".

At first there were two semi-rotary pumps and one aluminium lift and force pump to each brigade.

14. As the continuous and hard work made the pumps show signs of breaking down, on the 19th a telegram was sent to Captain Ogilvie, R.E., Peshawar, to obtain from Pindi or elsewhere three more lift and force pumps and send them up by special convoy; six were obtained from Rawalpindi Arsenal, three despatched on 20th from Rawalpindi and arrived at Nahakki on the following day. The remaining three pumps were used on the lines of communication.

15. The two Companies of Sappers and the 34th Sikh Pioneers also carried out the demolition of village defences and blew up no less than 144 towers of various descriptions, some round, others square, and both solid and hollow bases. Of these No. 1 Company accounted for 57.

The average charge was a little over 17lbs. guncotton.

16. The *nala* crossings on the tracks leading both to the Bohai Dag country and also in the direction of Yakh Dand and Mulla Kalai were also ramped down and made fit for camel traffic. As a rule one Company of Sappers and half a Battalion of the Pioneers accompanied each brigade and assisted in the various operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Dundee accompanied practically all the punitive expeditions undertaken.

17. Major Ewbank as Field Engineer, Lines of Communication, had charge of the work on the road and at the various posts on the lines of communication as well as improving the road up the Alikandi Nala. He was assisted by Captain A. R. C. Sanders, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer, and Lieutenant P. C. S. Hobart, 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

18. Huts were erected at Hafiz Kor and also at Shabkadar Camp for the sick and wounded, and arrangements made in all cases for a sufficient supply of pure, and in some instances of boiled, water.

19. Captain R. B. Skinner, R.E., accompanied the R. E. Field Park to Nahakki and was of great assistance generally.

20. In the work of forwarding stores, tools and explosives and assisting on the lines of communication great help was given by Barrack Sergeant Walke who had been sent to Shankargarh some time before the expedition started.

21. As regards *personnel* of the Sapper Companies I consider it would be advantageous if each section had its own commander.

22. As to material and equipment —

*Pumps*.—For a brigade a suitable outfit would be—

(1) Two aluminium lift and force pumps, 3" } Complete with armoured  
Four No. 5 Wilcox semi-rotary „ 16" } section.

(2) Canvas troughs .. .. According to requirements. Six pickets 6  
feet long for ends of suction pipes.

23. The lift and force pumps must be carried on camels, the semi-rotary on mules; 2 of the latter and some troughing should be in charge of a half section sappers and accompany the advanced guard on the march as a rule.

24. It will thus be possible to prevent pollution of water by dipping. The rest of pumps, etc., should follow at head of baggage.

25. The semi-rotary pumps worked well, are portable and can be easily and quickly fixed up. They weigh 90lbs. and two are a fully heavy load for a mule, but they are a good load and ride easily. The hoses go on a second mule.

26. It would be an improvement if the delivery hose had a "union" at each end to allow of second length being joined on.

27. The wrench supplied for the hose "union" is badly made, several of them broke. A flat bicycle spanner to fit the nuts is desirable and could, with the wrench, be made to fit into recess of board. The ordinary McMahon spanner cannot reach all the nuts owing to their confined situation.

28. The handle is very badly designed, three out of six broke. It should consist of a flat steel bar with two half round pieces of wood rivetted on to each side.

29. The aluminium double barrel lift and force pumps deliver much more water than the semi-rotary and are invaluable when a large number of animals have to be watered. They are very useful for pumping from tanks which have high banks. One pump will water 2,000 mules and horses in 3 hours.

The base board however is badly designed and should be made thicker and hinges omitted, iron loops being fitted to admit of board being picketed down.

In both cases suction and delivery hose should be interchangeable and have the same size "union."

30. In all cases the field park should carry a supply of steel, square and flat, of size suitable for repairs and when required more charcoal.

31. For the demolitions, Nobel's Copper Octuple (No. 8) detonators were used, two for each charge with 1 oz. primers.

The primer hole, however, is too small for these detonators and either larger primer holes should be made or else a rectifier of proper size should be supplied. Perhaps the detonator might be made with a thinner tube, of the same diameter as the sextuple (No. 6) Nobel detonator.

32. The gunmetal rectifier (screwed pattern) does not enlarge the hole in the primer nearly enough.

33. The "Octuple" copper detonator is recommended as possessing so many advantages, of portability, safety in handling, compactness in confined holes in towers, walls, etc., over the red "No. 8, Mark III Detonator for safety fuze" from the arsenal, that the latter was hardly ever used. These latter besides being very unnecessarily long do not keep well, and cannot be relied on if over three years old.

\* \* \* \* \*

35. The question of hand grenades has been raised and although it has been objected that an enemy might also make up bombs it would appear advisable to have a number for the use of pickets, as recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Dundee.

36. There are occasions when a search light would be useful if one could be manufactured suitable for mule carriage. Star shells have their use but flare lights as a rule are not a success.

37. Fougasses are very useful on occasion and it was remarked that when their existence was suspected the enemy held further off at night.

38. As regards tools carried by the Pioneers the usual complaints were heard, and when full sized tools were available from the R. E. Field Parks they were always used.

39. The Pioneer equipment might be improved, but it would be very inadvisable to arrange for all their tools to be carried on mules even though extra ammunition was issued to make up the weight. It is of immense importance to have the tools there when wanted.

J. E. DICKIE, *Colonel,*  
*Commanding Royal Engineer, Mohmand Field Force.*

\* \* \* \* \*

*Water-supply.*—In the Mohmand country good springs were found and used in the vicinity of the Nahakki camp, their combined output being about

20,000 gallons per diem. A small spring (about 5,000 gallons per diem) was used  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of the Ata Jor camp. Other springs were occasionally found, as at Koda Khel, and from the appearance of the hill sides, trees, vegetation, and sites of villages, many springs exist, but were too far away for use.

Running water was met and used at these points:—1 mile north of the Shabkadar camp, Dand camp, Ghalanai camp, Ambahar valley from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles west of Had to the Swat river, Mulla Kalai.\*

Elsewhere tank water alone was available.

These tanks are usually about  $40 \times 30$  yards, oval in plan, and vary from 1' to 4' deep. They are filled automatically by rain water, from gathering grounds of varying sizes, and are more or less dirty. The advance guard always put sentries over the tank, and no one was allowed to draw water till the arrival of the pumps.

The pumps were rigged up, and pumped water into canvas troughs for animals, and *pakhals* and *mussacks* for men.

The troughs for animals were variously made; troughs were cut in the ground and lined with tarpaulins, canvas troughs were made with rough wooden uprights, or inside inverted charpoys, etc.

The use of the pumps at tanks and springs prevented fouling to such an extent that the Nahakki tank, for example, after a week's use, had clearer water than when the troops arrived.

I think that the use of these pumps must have had a very beneficial effect on the health of the troops, and I strongly recommend that they always be used.

A brigade in my opinion requires four hand pumps (one spare); a division thus should have eight at divisional headquarters. I prefer the semi-rotary type. The lift and force pumps got out of order frequently, the handles worked by the men not lasting well.

\* \* \* \* \*

W. J. D. DUNDEE, *Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.,*  
*Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer, Mohmand Field Force.*

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\* Also at Lagham.

## APPENDIX IV.

### *EXTRACT FROM MEDICAL REPORT, MOHMAND FIELD FORCE.*

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(g) *Water-supply.*—The water in the Mohmand country was by current report very scarce and of indifferent quality. It was found that the inhabitants in many parts were altogether dependent on tanks filled by rain water, which drained into them from higher ground.

The troops were on several occasions obliged to use this water as the only available supply. No epidemic was traced to the water-supply though no doubt some of the cases of bowel complaint might be attributed to the bad water-supply met with at certain camps, although the force did not on the whole suffer greatly from this cause.

Below Shabkadar there was an excellent water-supply from the very rapid branches of the Kabul river ; the water was usually thick, but from the rate of the flow and free aeration it experienced, it could hardly have become contaminated to any extent. At Fort Shankargarh the drinking water was obtained from an excellent well outside the fort. The well was well built and protected, and the supply was plentiful.

At Camp Shabkadar wells were sunk in the dry bed of the river Subhan from which a sufficient and good supply was obtained. At Hafiz Kor, Dand and Ghalanai the water was of excellent quality, and plentiful ; it was obtained from the River Gandao. The river in its course sinks at various places into the ground to reappear lower down, thus natural filtration is obtained.

At all these posts, the places for drawing drinking water were well protected, and surrounded by barbed wire ; sentries were placed over the place where drinking water was obtained, and pumps were used to draw the water. Special places were also assigned and below the spot where the drinking supply was obtained, for animals and for washing.

At Nahakki at first the only place for obtaining drinking water was from a large tank with high banks. The water from this had to supply all needs of men and animals. Had any contamination of this supply taken place the result would have been most serious. A flying column was sent on to seize Nahakki and to secure this water-supply. Measures were at once taken to guard it against contamination. The tank was enclosed by barbed wire, an officer's guard was also mounted, and very stringent orders issued as to the times and method of supply. Pumps were used to draw the water, and a channel cut to carry the water into troughs for animals.

On a rough analysis (by Captain Bradfield, I.M.S.) this tank water was found to be a clear, hard, tasteless water, with no smell. Chlorides and oxi-

dizable matters were not in excess, though naturally it contained more oxidizable matters than the springs, which were ultimately discovered. Although a bacteriological examination would probably have shown contamination, the water was classed as a fair drinking water, and its use did not affect the health of the troops to any great extent. Besides this tank a well existed at the east side of the village; this was told off for the use of hospitals. This well was over 200 feet deep, cut through a rocky strata, and there was about 20 feet of water at the bottom. The well was reported to have been used by the villages for drinking purposes before our occupation; as it was not protected by a wall it had probably been contaminated by surface washings. It was returned after analysis as a very fair drinking water not containing chlorides or oxidizable matters in excess.

*Sro spring and No. 3 picquet spring.*—These two springs were discovered shortly after our occupation of Nahakki. They were situated on the hills to the east side of the camp; the height of the source rendered any contamination impossible. The water was obtained from them by pumping it from two small reservoirs, about 5 yards square. The water was very clear and sparkling. On analysis it proved an excellent drinking water. These springs were well picquettet and contamination prevented. The supply was ample, and was brought to the camp in the *pakhals*.

The water at Kasai, Umra Kalai, Habibzai, Khan Beg Kor, Lakarai and Taru was from rain water tanks. It was sufficient for a brigade, but of doubtful quality. At Kargha the water was from the Ambahar stream and was good and plentiful; at Mulla Kalai from the Danish Kol, which supplied excellent water; at Lagham from the Bann stream which gave a good and ample supply.

A water column had been formed to bring drinking water up from Ghalanai to Nahakki. The *pakhals* were carried on camels.

150 lbs. of alum and 20 lbs. of permanganate of potash were also carried by this water column, for the purification of water.

As the water had been reputed as bad in the Mohmand country, an application was made for a supply of Nesfield's sterilizing tablets for the two British regiments who were originally to have accompanied the force, with the view of prevention against enteric fever. Enough for 20,000 followers was supplied and this was distributed in equal parts to the two British battalions originally included in the 1st and 2nd Brigade, *viz.*, the 1st Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers, and the 1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.

When cholera was found to be prevalent an application was made for enough of these sterilizing tablets for the whole force, but these did not arrive till later. These tablets were distributed to British officers' messes and to native regiments. No objection was taken by the native soldiers to the water thus treated.

The 1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, who used these tablets through the campaign had very little bowel complaint, and the inference in this case was distinctly favourable.

It does not seem assured that these tablets are absolutely reliable, and the matter is still under debate. If their entire reliability could be assured, they would supply an easy method of water sterilization, which is badly needed.

Arrangements had been made for each British regiment to take six extra oval camp kettles to boil the water in, but the difficulty of cooling water, especially in the hot weather, makes boiling almost impracticable with troops on the march and engaged daily in expeditions from which they return late.

If boiling is to be relied on it must be carried on by one of the exchange system water sterilizers, by which the water comes out after boiling almost as cool as the water originally put in. Griffiths' sterilizer is a good example of this system and can be easily carried on a mule ; it gives about 50 gallons an hour ; probably one per 2 companies would be required. A specially instructed staff of two men would also be required to use it.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. R. WHITEHEAD, *Colonel,*  
*Principal Medical Officer, Mohmand Field Force*

CHERAT ;

27th June 1908.

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*APPENDIX V.*

*Numerical Return of Mohmand Field Force as on 1st June 1908.*

1	British Officers.	*British rank and file.	*Native Officers Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	Public followers.	Private followers.
TOTAL	334	2,375	10,361	1,462	617
Divisional Staff . . .	18	3	4	..	25
1st Brigade . . .	85	125	3,586	604	116
2nd Brigade . . .	109	684	3,655	449	234
3rd Brigade . . .	122	1,563	3,116	409	242

\* Exclusive of Supply and Transport personnel except such as was attached to Field and General Hospitals.

*Statement showing Supply† and Transport personnel and transport animals employed with Mohmand Field Force, 1908.*

British Officers . . . . .	27	
British Honorary Commissioned, Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers.	56	
Native Establishments . . . . .	3,653	Includes 18 Native Officers.
Pack Mules . . . . .	3,760	
Camels . . . . .	3,831	
Bullocks . . . . .	133	

† Exclusive of that attached to Field and General Hospitals.

## APPENDIX VI.

### *REPORT ON VISUAL SIGNAL STATIONS USED AND ATTEMPTED DURING THE OPERATIONS IN THE KHAIBAR AND MOHMAND COUNTRY—MAY 1908.*

In considering for future use the practicability of the Visual Signalling Lines and Stations herein described, the following points must be borne in mind :—

(1) The operations were carried out in the month of May when the weather, though exceedingly hot, was fine with but few exceptions, and the atmosphere remarkably clear and favourable for long distance work had such been otherwise feasible.

(2) A permanent Telegraph Line connected the Base at Peshawar with Landi Kotal in the Khaibar, while the Field Telegraph extended the Line from Peshawar to the Advanced Depôt at Nahakki village in the Mohmand country. Visual Signalling Lines were established between the Base and these places with a view to—

- (a) relieving the pressure of work on the telegraph wires if necessary ;
- (b) bridging gaps caused by the possible breaking or cutting of the wires ;
- (c) transmitting comparatively unimportant messages for intermediate posts on the line.

(3) Eight Special Signalling Units were used altogether. One Special Signalling Unit was permanently attached to the Headquarters of the Division and one to each of the 1st and 2nd Brigades.

Five Special Units are ordinarily required to work the Line of Communication through the Khaibar while five were used on the Mohmand Line, the following being the distribution :—

*Khaibar Line.*—One Special Signalling Unit at each of the following stations :—

- (i) Fort Maude.
- (ii) Ali Masjid Fort.
- (iii) Kata Kushta.
- (iv) Block-house (LK) south of Landi Kotal Fort.
- (v) Landi Kotal Fort.

*N.B.*—When the Khaibar becomes filled with haze in July and August an extra Unit must be put into Zin Tara between (iii) and (iv). Total then required would be six Special Signalling Units.

*Mohmand Line*—

One	Special	Signalling	Unit	at	Dand.
Two	do.	do.	do.	Ghalanai.	
Two	do.	do.	do.	Nahakki.	

*N.B.*—Six Special Signalling Units is the least number that can work this line satisfactorily, as there should be three Units at Ghalanai.

In deciding upon the number of Special Signalling Units required the length of the operations, amount of work, provision against casualties from sickness or other causes, must be considered as well as the size of the Force and probable number of posts on the Line of Communications.

(4) All bearings, except where otherwise stated, were taken with the same Prismatic Compass, having a variation of  $2^{\circ}$  East, but to facilitate reference the *True* bearings of stations have been shown in each case.

In some cases the bearings do not correspond exactly with the lines laid down on the accompanying map, but, with the description given, are sufficiently accurate for the identification of the stations used. Distances taken from map are given to nearest  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile.

(5) Letters enclosed in brackets refer to stations marked with similar letters on accompanying map.

(6) A set of equipment, except for a Special Signalling Unit for which see Field Service Regulations, India, Appendix I, is taken as one Helio., one Lamp, one Telescope, one pair Field Glasses with complement of flags, message books, etc.

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### Peshawar.

*Signal Station.*—On Church Tower.

*Personnel.*—Six Signallers (four British, two of Indian Army).

*Equipment.*—Three sets.

*Hours of work.*—9 A.M. one day to 9 A.M. next.

*Reliefs.*—Every 24 hours.

*Orderlies.*—One foot orderly used. A cyclist orderly is required.

*Shelter.*—In the hot weather some extemporized form of shelter is necessary.

The mist and haze rising from the rivers, irrigated land and villages in the evening render communication by means of a single 'BB' lamp difficult and at times impossible. This was overcome to a certain extent when working with Shabkadar by tying two or three lamps together, but even then communication was difficult. A 'CC' lamp was used a little more successfully. If available, an *acetylene* lamp here and at Shabkadar might render communication more certain. Even greater difficulty was experienced when working with Michni.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Shabkadar . . . .	8°	15	
Michni . . . .	342 $\frac{1}{2}$ °	13	
Jamrud . . . .	282°	9	} Bearings and distances from map.

*Communication possible with—*

Karappa Pass (in Gandao) . .	344°	23	} Bearings and distances approximate.
Fort Maude . . . .	278°	14	

**Jamrud.**

*Signal Station.*—On top of Fort.

*Personnel.*—Six Signallers, British and Indian Army mixed, furnished by Officer Commanding Fort, from troops under his command.

*Equipment.*—Three sets.

*Hours of work.*—

*Reliefs.*— } Arranged for under orders of Officer Commanding  
*Orderlies.*— } Fort.

*Shelter.*—Some kind of extemporized shelter is required during the hot weather.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Peshawar (Church Tower) . .	102°	9	
Shabkadar . . . .	36°	19	
Fort Maude . . . .	271°	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	} Bearings and distances from map.

A permanent Telegraph Office is located in the Fort.

**Fort Maude.**

*Signal Station.*—At block-house on top of knoll on south side of road; from which a path easily accessible for transport leads to summit.

*Personnel.*—Special Signalling Unit (four British Signallers, two of Indian Army).

*Equipment.*—As for a Special Signalling Unit.

*Escort.*—No special escort required, as the block-house was held by a detachment of Khaibar Rifles.

*Water.*—Supplied by the Native Contractor who provides the detachment Khaibar Rifles with it.

*Rations.*—Supplied for three or four days at a time from Ali Masjid camp.

*Transport* (three mules)—Kept at Ali Masjid camp for rationing and safety, as no such facilities exist at the block-house.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Jamrud . . . . . Ali Masjid . . . . .	91° 313½°	4½ 3 ½	Bearings and distances from map.

*Communication possible with—*

Peshawar (Church Tower) . . .	98°	14	Bearings and distances from map.
Zera Kotal . . . . .	237°	5	

This block-house is typical of those built in the Khaibar, all the rest having been constructed on very similar lines. Heliographs can be worked on the roof, and lamps through the large port-holes which are protected by bullet-proof metal doors. In case of need heliographs can also be worked through these port-holes at certain periods of the day according to the position of the sun.

### Ali Masjid Fort.

*Signal Station.*—On roof of Fort at east end.

*Personnel.*—Six signallers detailed by Officer Commanding Fort, assisted by two British Signallers from camp in ravine below.

*Equipment.*—Two sets.

*Hours of work.*—

*Reliefs.*— } Arranged by Officer Commanding Fort.  
*Orderlies.*— }

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Camp in ravine immediately below Fort . . . . .	—	—	
Fort Maude block-house . . . . . Kata Kushta do. . . . .	133½° 357°	3 ½ 1 ½	Bearings and distances from map.

A Special Signalling Unit should be located at the Fort if the Line of Communication has to be maintained for any length of time. Arrangements for their rations, transport, etc., could be made with Camp Commandant in ravine below.

A Field Telegraph Office was opened in camp in the ravine, but the Fort itself was not connected by wire. It would be a convenience to connect the Fort and Camp by Telephone.

### Kata Kushta.

*Signal Station (KA).*—At block-house lying on summit of conical hill, the bottom of which takes one hour to reach on foot from Ali Masjid camp. The ascent, which is commenced from the Ali Masjid side of the hill is made in about half an hour by a narrow, very stony and fairly steep path, up which mules must be led separately.

*Personnel.*—Special Signalling Unit (four British Signallers and two of Indian Army).

*Equipment.*—As for a Special Signalling Unit.

*Escort.*—No special escort required as the block-house was held by a detachment of Khaibar Rifles.

*Water.*—Supplied by the Native Contractor, who supplies it every two days to the detachment, Khaibar Rifles, and stored in block-house.

*Rations.*—Supplied for 3 or 4 days at a time from Ali Masjid camp.

*Transport* (three mules).—Kept at Ali Masjid camp for rationing and protection, as no such facilities exist at block-house.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Ali Masjid Fort . . .	177°	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	
Zin Tara . . .	299°	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Block-house (LK) to south of Landi Kotal Fort . . .	296°	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
			Bearings and distances from map.

### Zin Tara.

*Signal Station (ZA).*—At block-house on spur south of Wali Khel. This station was discontinued when it was found that (LK) could communicate direct with Kata Kushta (KA). Later on, in July and August, the heat haze renders a transmitting station at this block-house a necessity. It would then require a Special Signalling Unit with its equipment complete. Arrangements for rations, and for the protection and rationing of its transport, are more conveniently made from Landi Kotal than Ali Masjid. No special escort required as detachment, Khaibar Rifles, holds block-house. Water supplied locally.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Kata Kushta . . .	119°	2½	
Block-house (LK) to south of Landi Kotal Fort . . .	295°	4½ }	Bearings and distances from map.

**Ghutzai block-house to South of Landi Kotal Fort.**

*Signal Station (LK).*—In left of two block-houses (as viewed from Fort) placed close together on ridge about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile south of Fort.

Since this block-house is so near the Fort, all arrangements for personnel, equipment, rations, water, etc., can conveniently be made from it.

A Special Signalling Unit would require to be located here.

The light of the helio. and lamp at Kata Kushta just clears the ridge to the right of the Zin Tara block-house as viewed from the Signal Station (LK).

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Zin Tara . . .	115°	4½	
Kata Kushta . . .	116°	7½	Bearings and distances from map.
Landi Kotal Fort . . .	—	¾	Distance approximate.

**Landi Kotal.**

*Signal Station (FT).*—Over main gateway of Fort.

A terminal station is all that is required here to work with the block-house (LK) on ridge to south, unless operations are being conducted in the neighbourhood, or the Line of Communication be extended towards Afghanistan, when arrangements would have to be made accordingly.

The transport for Special Signalling Units was kept in an entrenched camp adjoining the Fort. Rations were drawn from a supply dépôt inside the Fort and special orders issued with regard to supply of drinking water for men and animals.

A permanent Telegraph office is situated inside the Fort quite close to the Signal Station over the main gateway.

## Shabkadar (or Shankargarh Fort).

*Signal Station.*—On staging in Fort.

*Personnel.*—Six to eight Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed) according to requirements.

*Equipment.*—Four sets.

*Hours of work.*—}

*Reliefs.*—} Arranged by Brigade Signalling Officer, 3rd Brigade.  
*Orderlies.*—}

*Shelter.*—Tent and waterproof sheets.

As with Peshawar, lamp communication especially towards that place is the main difficulty.

From staging in Fort communication was obtained with—

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Peshawar . . . .	188°	15	
Naguman Bridge . . . .	162°	7½	
Malakand . . . .	34°	33	
Abazai . . . .	12°	7	
Matta Mughal Khel . . . .	350°	4½	
Michni . . . .	246½°	7	Station on hill with piquet. Fort itself not visible.
Hafiz Kor . . . .	282°	4½	
Dand . . . .	297°	7¾	
Karappa Pass . . . .	305°	11	
Jamrud Fort . . . .	216°	19	
Takht-i-Bhai . . . .	78°	22	Transmitting station for Mardan.

## Hafiz Kor.

*Signal Station.*—On ridge of a conspicuous isolated hill shown on map to south-south-east of village of Hafiz Kor. This hill, shaped thus looking at it from south-east side, rises up from the plain conspicuously above the other low hills in the vicinity and is particularly easy to identify at Shabkadar, Dand and Karappa Pass. A terminal station was formed in camp near the Telegraph tent, 15 minutes walk east-south-east of the transmitting station on the hill.

*Personnel.*—Six Signallers for transmitting station on hill.

Three Signallers for terminal in camp.

*Equipment.*—Two sets for hill, one for camp.

\* Position of Signal Station.

*Water*.—Obtainable from pools in bed of Gandao stream, about one mile east of signal station on hill.

*Transport*.—Mules can be got to foot of the hill with ease, whence kits and equipment can be carried up to the Station by hand.

From hill north-west of camp communication obtained with—

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Shabkadar . . . . .	102°	4½	
Dand . . . . .	315°	4	Station on hill close to Bakaro Mena Kandao.
Karappa Pass . . . .	317°	7½	
<i>From camp</i> — Shabkadar . . . .	102°	4½	There is only one place in camp where the light from the Fort can be seen through an opening in the rising ground to the south-east.

### Dand.

*Signal Stations*.—North-north-west of camp on plateau above river-bed and situated on round hill-top (provided with a *sangar*) which lies about 50 yards on east side of road at point where it crosses first *kotal* (Bakoro Mena) above camp, from a solitary tree in middle of which it is about 15 to 20 minutes climb by the road. The following bearings were taken from the Signal Station to further fix its position :—

To highest point on ridge immediately above and on west side of camp . . 16  
To highest point of 3-coned hill to the eastward . . . . . 38

A Terminal Station is required in camp and was established near the Telegraph Office which was close to the isolated tree mentioned.

A piquet was located on this hill-top and connected by telephone with Signalling Station in camp.

This Signal Station with piquet on hill top can be occupied for night work.

*Personnel*.—One Special Signalling Unit (four British Signallers and two of Indian Army) for station on hill.

Three Signallers for Terminal Station in camp, or one Telephone Operator on hill and one in camp.

*Equipment*.—Two sets for hill, one set for camp, or flags if no helio. available, as distance between hill and camp in direct line is only about  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile.

*Water*.—Obtainable from bed of Gandao stream below camp on plateaus.

*Transport.*—Mules can be taken right up to Signal Station.

*Road.*—Road from camp, steep and rocky, but very greatly improved by working parties.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearings.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Shabkadar . . . .	117°	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
Hafiz Kor . . . .	135°	4	
Karappa Pass . . . .	321°	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Dand Camp . . . .	162°	$\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$	Station immediately to west of <i>kotal</i> .

### Ghalanai.

To connect Ghalanai with Dand and Nahakki Pass the following Stations were furnished from the Ghalanai Post:—

1. Transmitting Station (K.P) at Karappa Pass.

2. Transmitting Station (G.N.)—

either (a) on low hill about two miles north-west of Ghalanai camp, or (b) on high ridge about 3 $\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-west of Ghalanai camp.

3. Transmitting Station (S.C.)—

(a) on hill south of 1st camp, used until this camp was vacated;

(b) on knoll on north face of 2nd camp, used until this camp was broken up.

If available three Special Signalling Units should be detailed to Ghalanai.

#### 1. Karappa Pass (K. P.).

*Signal Station.*—Situated on rocky point a few yards to west of point where road crosses *kotal* and furnished by a Special Signalling Unit sent out daily from Ghalanai with a suitable escort. It was considered too far (about 45 to 50 minutes march) from camp, and would have required too large an escort, for a night as well as a day station.

*Equipment.*—As laid down for a Special Signalling Unit.

*Water.*—Taken up in metal *pakhals* with party from Ghalanai camp.

*Transport.*—Road accessible for transport to top of *kotal*.

*Hours of work.*—8 A.M. to 5 P.M. unless pressure of work great, when station closed at 6 P.M., to enable party to get back to camp before dark.

## Communication obtained with—

Station.	Bearings.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Dand . . . . .	141°	3½	
Hafiz Kor . . . . .	137°	7½	
Shabkadar . . . . .	125°	11	
Peshawar . . . . .	(approx.) 164°	23	
S.C. (a) (Hill south of 1st camp)	310°	1	Bearing and distance unreliable.
S.C. (b) (Knoll north face of 2nd camp)	303°	2	
G.N. (a) (Hill 2 miles north-west of camps)	290½°	3½	Bearing unreliable.

N.B.—Communication with Nahakki Pass cannot be obtained direct. See notes on the Stations used on Nahakki ridge.

## 2. Transmitting Station G. N. (a)

*Signal Station.*—On low hill surmounted by dark coloured stone ruin on west of road about 2 miles north-west of Ghalanai camps. Position marked on map as south of *sangar* and south-east of Durba Khel. This station was also occupied by day only by Special Signalling Unit sent out under escort from Ghalanai camps. From the Signal Station the Nahakki and Karappa Passes, the high hill SC(a) south of 1st camp and the knoll SC(b) on north face of 2nd camp can be seen, but neither of the two camps themselves nor yet the Khapak ridge are visible from this point.

*Equipment.*—As laid down for a Special Signalling Unit.

*Water.*—Taken out in metal *pakhals* with party from Ghalanai camp.

*Transport.*—The ground between the camps and top of Signal Station hill is easy going for mules, the route for most of the distance following the bed of a broad and shallow *nala*.

*Hours of work.*—As for Karappa Pass.

## Communication obtained with—

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Karappa Pass (K.P.) . . .	110½°	3½	Bearing unreliable.
Nahakki Pass (N.I.) . . .	342°	4½	Station B on map (see Nahakki ridge).
S.C. (a) (Hill south of 1st camp)			
S.C. (b) (Knoll north face, 2nd camp).			

### Transmitting Station G.N. (b)

*Signal Station.*—On high, rocky point of ridge to east of road about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-by-west of Ghalanai camps. This station, which is a stiff climb up from the foot of the slope ( $\frac{3}{4}$  hour) was given up in favour of G. N. (a) owing to the greater distance from camp and its inaccessibility to mule transport, the only advantage it possesses over G. N. (a) being that communication can also be obtained with the Khapak Pass in addition to the Nahakki Pass, Karappa Pass, S. C. (a) and S. C. (b). The station was only occupied by day and an escort was required.

*Equipment.*—As laid down for a Special Signalling Unit. A third helio. would be wanted here if communication were also required with the Khapak Pass.

*Water.*—Taken out from camp with the party in metal *pakhals* and left at foot of hill, with mules.

*Transport.*—Mules can only be got as far as the bottom of the hill whence equipment and *chayuls*, etc., must be carried up by hand.

*Hours of work.*—As for Karappa Pass.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Nahakki Pass (N.I.) . .	341°	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	Signal station on ridge about 400 yards west of <i>kotal</i> (marked B on map).
Khapak Pass . .	275°	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	Bearing unreliable. Signal
Karappa Pass } bearings not S.C. (a) } taken .	{ 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	{ 3	station on very high point about 1,200 yards south of <i>kotal</i> .
S.C. (b) .		3	

### Transmitting Station S.C. (a)

*Signal Station.*—On west end of a high and unmistakable hill immediately south of 1st camp used to connect Karappa Pass, G. N. (a) and G. N. (b) with terminal station in 1st camp. The Signallers, together with their equipment, were furnished from troops in camp under the orders of the Post Commandant and worked as long as communication was required.

### Transmitting Station S. C. (b)

*Signal Station.*—On knoll on north face of 2nd camp, used for connecting G. N. (a) or G. N. (b) and Karappa Pass with camp. The personnel and equipment were also found under the orders of the Post Commandant from the troops under his command. A pathway was made up to the Signal Station from camp and the station itself protected by a *sangar*. A couple of foot orderlies are required for the delivery of messages to and from the telegraph office and other parts of camp.

**Nahakki ridge (including Khazana hill).**

*Signal Stations.*—The following three stations furnished from camp at Nahakki village were used at different times and are mentioned in order in which occupied :—

*Station A.*—On high rocky point on ridge about 1,200 yards west of the road over the *kotal*.

This possesses no advantages over B as regards communication with the Ghalanai stations or with those to the northwards. But if *direct* communication be also required with the Khapak ridge to the south-west as well as with the Ghalanai stations, a signal station established here can communicate direct with a station (K.K.) placed on the summit of a very high conical point on the ridge about 1,200 yards south of the Khapak Pass from which conical point the camp at Ata Jor tank about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles to east of Khan Beg Kor, and the station G. N. (b),  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-west of Ghalanai camp, can likewise be got direct. Both stations, A. and K. K., are each a stiff  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour's climb from their respective *kotals*, which is as far as mules can be got, while G. N. (b) takes from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{3}{4}$  hour to ascend from foot of hill, and each of the three stations requires a strong escort. If, however, a transmitting station be established on the ridge to the north-east of the Khapak Pass at D (*vide map*), as was actually done during the first combined operations on the Pass, then B is a more convenient station than A.

A column moving by the Bohai Dag valley towards Koda Khel becomes lost to view near the village of Ato Khel, being shut out by the ridges and spurs of the Nahakki ridge immediately to the westward of this point A.

Similarly a column moving from Ghalanai towards the Khapak Pass becomes lost to view near Kasai village owing to the ridge lying to the south of, and parallel to, the Nahakki ridge intervening, and a column moving westwards from Umra Kalai is obscured by the Darwazagai range about a mile to west of the former village. After these points shall have been passed, therefore, communication must be sought through stations established with piquets on the intervening heights. This also applies to stations B and C excepting that the valley of the Bohai Dag again becomes visible to the latter station (C) in vicinity of Koda Khel, e.g., points F and G, *vide map* and notes on Koda Khel Signal Station.

Personnel, equipment, water and transport same as for station B. Hours worked, 8-15 A.M. to 6-5 P.M.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Nahakki village . . . .	—	1	Bearing not taken.
N. (a) (hill 2 miles north-west of Ghalanai and south of <i>singar</i> ) . . . .	157°	5	

*Communication possible with—*

Koda Khel village through—

- (1) Khapak ridge (K. K.);
- (2) ridge (P.S.) about 3 or 4 miles north-west of Ata Jor tank (A.R.);
- (3) knoll (W.) north-east of Koda Khel;

all three of which stations require escorts.

*N.B.*—This line should not be used if station can be established on Khazanu hill (C).

- (4) Ata Jor (A.R.) through Khapak ridge (K.K.)
- (5) Lakarai village through station (M) on west bank of *nala* about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile south-west of Lakarai village.
- (6) Kasai, south of Darwazagai range—direct.
- (7) Umra Kalai (U.I.)—direct.
- (8) G. N. (b) hill  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-by-west of Ghalanai—direct.

### Nahakki Ridge Station B.

*Station B.*—On rocky point about 400 yards west of road over *kotal*.

This point was most frequently used from 15th to 30th May for undermentioned reasons :—

- (1) It was more easily accessible than either A or C. It was comparatively close to the road over the *kotal* and could be reached in about  $\frac{3}{4}$  hour from Nahakki tank, whereas A took about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  and C 2 hours to ascend from same place.
- (2) It could be, and was, used as a night as well as a day station, as piquets were located here both by day and by night, whereas A and C were too far away and would have required too large an escort to furnish a night station.
- (3) Special escort not required as in case of A and C.
- (4) Communication was established with the majority of places desired if not direct, then through transmitting stations with piquets, and moreover could be maintained longer by day than A and C.

*Personnel.*—Special Signalling Unit.

*Equipment.*—Three sets, if possible.

*Water.*—Obtainable from tank at Nahakki village or from springs in direction of Sro village to east of former place.

*Transport.*—Mules taken to top of *kotal*, whence equipment kit, rations, water carried up by hand to Signal Station along ridge.

*Hours of work.*—8 A.M. to 5 P. M., or as required.

*Reliefs.*—Duty at Central Station in Nahakki village and on ridge taken in turns by the two Special Units.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.

Ghalanai camp, through (1) G. N. (a) bearing  $162^{\circ}$ , distance  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles,  
or (2) G. N. (b) bearing  $161^{\circ}$ , distance  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

Ata Jor camp, through (1) D. on ridge south-west of and parallel to  
Nahakki ridge,

and (2) K. K. on ridge south of Khapak Pass.

Kasai camp, through piquet on hill bearing  $315^{\circ}$ , distance  $3\frac{3}{4}$  miles.

Lakarai camp, through station M on low mound on west bank of *nala*,  
 $\frac{3}{4}$  mile south-west of Lakarai village bearing  $334^{\circ}$ ,  
distance  $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

Nahakki camp direct, bearing  $16^{\circ}$  to centre of tank adjoining village  
on west side; distance  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile.

Yakh Dand direct, bearing  $352^{\circ}$  to Signalling Station on bank of tank;  
distance 7 miles.

Umra Kalai direct, bearing not taken, distance  $5\frac{3}{4}$  miles.

*Communication possible with—*

Shato Khel camp, through Shatai Pass.

Had camp, through WR on height 2 miles south-west of Had.

Koda Khel, through (1) G. N. (b)  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-west of Ghalanai,  
and (2) K. K. on ridge south of Khapak Pass,  
and (3) P. S. on ridge 3 to 4 miles north-west of  
Ata Jor,  
and (4) west on knoll north-east of Khuda Khel  
village.

*N.B.*—Each of the above intermediate stations would require escorts and communication only practicable by day.

**Nahakki Ridge Station C.**

On first highest peak of Khazana about 2,400 yards east of road over Nahakki Kotal.

This station from its elevation (about 4,800 feet) and extensive range of vision is by far the best of those on the Nahakki ridge for purely signalling purposes. Its drawbacks were—

- (1) its distance from camp at Nahakki village, about a two hours' stiff climb;
- (2) the large escort required.

*Personnel.*—Special Signalling Unit.

*Equipment.*—As for do. do.

**Water.**—Obtainable from camp tank, spring near Sro and spring in bushy ravine about half way between top of hill and bottom of slope on north side.

**Transport.**—Hill not accessible to mule transport. Equipment, rations, water, etc., must be carried up by hand.

**Road.**—No path or track but the bushy ravine south-east of Nahakki village leading past the spring already mentioned is as direct a way as any, and takes about 2 hours to negotiate the summit from the tank at Nahakki village.

*Communication obtained with* —

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
W. on knoll $\frac{3}{4}$ mile north-east of Koda Khel . . .	278°	13 $\frac{1}{4}$	
P.S. on ridge 3 to 4 miles north-west of Ata Jor tank . . .	273°	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Nahakki camp . . .	—	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	

*Communication possible with following stations from which Khazana hill was recognized :—*

Ghalanai Camp, through hill marked T on map to westward of 2nd Camp from which it was about 20 minutes climb to top. Distance 6 miles.

Karappa Pass, direct. Distance 6 $\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

Dand Camp, through station on Bakaro Mena. Distance 10 miles.

Khapak Pass, through conical hill K.K. Distance to (KK) 6 miles.

*Communication probable with following :—*

Peshawar direct. Distance between 30 and 31 miles.

Mulla Kalai camp, through (R) on high conical hill on right bank of river. Distance to (R) 6 $\frac{1}{4}$  miles.

### Nahakki Village.

This village lies at the foot of the Nahakki Pass on the north side at about 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  miles by road from the *kotal*. It is easily distinguishable by a large circular water tank adjoining it on the west side which formed one of the chief sources of water-supply.

This was the furthest point reached by the Field Telegraph, and the Advanced Supply Depôt was formed here, so that the place became the *point d'appui* from which Brigades conducted their punitive operations.

A central signal station was established on the roof of a native house at the north-east corner of the village. This building, in the courtyard of which the Divisional Staff were quartered, was rendered conspicuous by a stone tower on the east side, on the roof adjoining which the Signallers were stationed.

A Special Signalling Unit sent out daily from here occupied one of the Signalling Stations A, B or C on Nahakki ridge to communicate with the Line of Communication through the Ghalanai stations, and also with whichever brigade might be operating in the neighbouring valleys. Station B was occupied a few times by night, and should be used when communication by night with troops operating in the vicinity of Umra Kalai and Yakh Dand is desired, as, owing to the low ridge of hills lying immediately to the south of Lakai, direct communication, either by day or night, between these two places and Nahakki village must not be relied on.

One of the brigades at a time was usually camped in and around the village and tank and furnished piquets on Nahakki ridge for the protection of the Telegraph line over the pass, and on the lower portions of the spurs east of camp. These piquets were connected with camp by lamps at night.

*Communication obtained with —*

Nahakki ridge, Stations (A) and (B).

Khazana Hill, Station (C).

Umra Kalai direct, bearing not taken ; lies nearly due north, distance 5 miles.

Kasai camp through piquet on hill above camp (bearing not taken).

*Operating Brigades :—*

- (1) moving by Bohai Dag valley to Khan Beg Kor, through Station (J) on mound with conspicuous, light-coloured tower on it, about 3 to 4 miles north-west of Nahakki village ;
- (2) moving to Gumbatai and Khwaja Kuhai, through Station (S) on ridge immediately to south-west of Gumbatai village ;
- (3) moving westwards from Umra Kalai, through Signalling Station established with piquet on the Darwazagai range north-east of Darwazagai Pass ;
- (4) moving down Pipal valley, through Station (W. R.) on height about 2 miles south-west of tank at Had village.

**Khapak Pass.**

*Signal Station (K.K.).*—On conspicuous conical height on ridge about 1,200 yards south of the road over the *kotal* from which it is a stiff  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour's climb to the top along the watershed. Two and a quarter hours should be allowed to reach this Signalling Station from the camp at Ata Jor.

This was used as a Transmitting Station between the brigades operating from east and west of the Khapak Pass, and also for a limited time to connect station B on Nahakki ridge with Ata Jor camp, once through D and once through G N (b).

A signalling party was also established here during the return of the 2nd Brigade from Ata Jor to Ghalanai and protected by a suitable piquet.

From the summit of this conical height, Ata Jor tank is just visible over shoulder of hill ; P. S. on ridge 3 to 4 miles north-west of Ata Jor ; the Khazana station (C) and station (A) on Nahakki ridge can be got direct, but neither of these latter stations were occupied at the same time as (K. K.).

*Personnel*.—Six Signallers.

*Equipment*.—Two sets (preferably three).

*Water*.—Obtainable from tank at Ata Jor camp to west of pass, or tank at Tora Tiga village in plain about two miles east of pass.

*Transport*.—Mules can be got up to top of Khapak Pass from either east or west side, but thence equipment, water, etc., must be carried to signal station by hand.

*Road*.—Follow road to top of *kotal* then take watershed line of ridge as there is no path leading to top of the hill.

*Communication obtained with*—

Nahakki ridge Station (B) through (1) transmitting Station (D),  
or (2) transmitting station (G. N. (b)).

[*N. B.*.—Station (B) cannot be got direct from (K. K.).]

Ata Jor camp direct, bearing 294, distance  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles ; G N (b) on ridge north of Sangar.

*Communication possible with following, which could be seen* :—

Nahakki ridge, Station (A) direct, bearing 51°.

Nahakki ridge, Station (C) direct bearing 63°.

P. S. on ridge, 3 to 4 miles north-west of Ata Jor tank, bearing 295°.

Z on sketch below, a ridge with a small ruined tower at either end about 1 mile north-west of Ghalanai camp, bearing to southern tower 106°.

Several small hill-tops in immediate vicinity of Ghalanai were just visible over the intervening ridges, and it was thought probable that communication could be got with that place, by pre-arrangement, between hill S. C. (a) to south of 1st camp, or even S. C. (b) on north face of 2nd camp, without having to send a party out so far as G. N. (b).

The Karappa Pass was not visible, being shut out by a spur from Tora Tiga hill, neither could G. N. (a) be seen.

### Koda Khel.

*Signal Station (W)*.—On top of one of the easternmost of several round-topped knolls lying about  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile to the east of the northernmost tank which adjoins a building on west bank of *nala*. This was not the highest point of this feature, the general direction of which was north from the main range which itself ran east and west, but situated as it was about 300 yards or so to the west of the track leading to the village, easily accessible to animals, and commanding a view of the country to the east and west as

well as to the south it formed an ideal position for the staff as well as for a Signalling Station. This point was occupied by the Divisional Staff and was established as a Signal Station, while the 2nd Brigade operating from Ata Jor camp demolished Koda Khel village and seized the heights to south of it.

Bearings taken to fix its position were to Khazana (hill station C)  $98^\circ$ , and to the point where the track disappeared over the *kotal* south-west of Koda Khel village  $227^\circ$ .

*Personnel*.—Six Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed).

*Equipment*.—Two sets.

*Water*.—Obtainable from tank adjoining native house on left bank of *nala* about  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile to west of signal station.

*Transport*.—Could get to top of knoll. Good cover exists in folds of ground for animals.

*Communication obtained with*—

Nahakki village, through Khazana hill (C) bearing  $98^\circ$ , distance  $13\frac{1}{4}$  miles.

Ata Jor camp, through Station P. S. on ridge between 3 and 4 miles north-west of camp bearing  $116^\circ$ , distance  $1\frac{3}{4}$  miles.

Bearing of Station at Ata Jor camp from P.S.  $117^\circ$ , distance  $4\frac{1}{4}$  miles.

On withdrawing with the rear-guard from the Signal Station at W communication with Khazana hill (C) was subsequently obtained from a point in the valley below near that marked F on map. From F the signal station C on Khazana hill was just visible through an opening in the ridge east of Wucha Jawar, but this was the last place in the valley on the return to Ata Jor whence it could be obtained direct owing to intervening ridges and heights. Further communication from valley practicable with C through P S until piquets with latter retired.

The best signal station for communication between Nahakki village and Koda Khel or places further up the valleys to the west and north-west is undoubtedly the one used on Khazana hill (C). Stations A and B on Nahakki ridge present difficulties in the way of furnishing transmitting stations, which render their occupation for this purpose unsuitable.

#### Transmitting Station P.S.

The transmitting station situated on one of the rocky points (not the highest) towards the west end of a ridge lying between 3 and 4 miles in direct line north-west of Ata Jor camp, from which it was about a  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours' march, forms an important point from which to keep communication with a column moving along the broad valley to Koda Khel or up the Spinkai Tangi as well as with Nahakki village through Khazana hill (C).

A Double Company, 28th Punjabis, piquetted this ridge all day, withdrawing with the rear-guard, the Signallers (British and Indian Army) retiring with it.

*Personnel.*—Six Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed).

*Equipment.*—Two sets (three if available).

*Transport.*—Brought to foot of slope on south side along a good path. Equipment, water, etc., taken up by hand.

The Signal Station at Khazana hill looked almost exactly the same in appearance from the signal station (W) near Koda Khel. The station (C) was on a dark coloured conical hill behind which another and higher hill formed a very dark background.

*Communication obtained with—*

Station.	Bearing.	Distance in miles.	Remarks.
Ata Jor camp (tank)	. .	117°	
Khazana hill (C)	. .	93°	11½
Koda Khel knoll (W)	. .	296°	1¾

*Communication possible with K. K. bearing 115°, distance 7½ miles.*

#### Ata Jor Camp.

*Signal Station (A. R.).*—On west bank of water tank around which the camp was formed. There was no village here; the tank lies about 1½ miles to east of village of Khan Beg Kor and about 400 to 500 yards west of a deep *nala* running generally north and south. Communication with Nahakki village or ridge cannot be got direct, but can be obtained in following ways by day only :—

- (1) A party of Signallers moved outside the perimeter of camp to a point (marked H on map) near west bank of *nala* 300 to 400 yards north of tank (to which bearing was 185°), can communicate with Nahakki village through a Transmitting Station sent out under escort from the latter place to a conspicuous light coloured tower on low hill (marked J on map) at foot of a long spur running north from the Nahakki ridge.

A couple of orderlies for delivery of messages in camp would be required at this station H.

This is the best line as only one transmitting station (at J) is necessary. It is however open to the objection that a strong escort (Cavalry for choice) would be required owing to the distance it lies from Nahakki village (about 4 miles by road). For this reason as well as for the fact that the station (H) at

Ata Jor must be outside the perimeter of camp and the hills to the east are too far off to pique by night, communication cannot be maintained at night and must cease by day at such time as will enable the Transmitting Station at (J) to get back to Nahakki camp before dark.

Bearing of J from H was 54°.

- (2) Through Transmitting Station on conical hill KK on ridge south of Khapak Pass and another established at A or C on Nahakki ridge.
- (3) Through Transmitting Stations as KK, D or GN (b) and B on Nahakki ridge. These were each used during the operations.

(2) and (3) are alternative methods but, owing to the greater number of transmitting stations required, the distances to be traversed and heights to be climbed, are not to be preferred should choice of methods exist. They, likewise, cannot be used for night work.

*From tank communication obtained with—*

*Nahakki village* through following transmitting stations :—

Khapak Pass (KK), bearing 114°.

Ridge north-west of KK (D), bearing not taken.

Nahakki ridge (B), bearing not taken from D.

*Ghalanai camp and Nahakki village* through following :—

Khapak Pass (KK), bearing 114°.

Ridge north of sangar [ G N (b) ], bearing not taken but lies approximately due E of KK.

*Nahakki ridge* (B) invisible from KK.

### Umra Kalai Camp.

*Signal Station (U1).*—In village on roof of house occupied by Divisional Staff. This was the only safe place in village from which communication with Nahakki village just visible over low ridge of hills to south of Lakai could be obtained at night. A station should be established on Nahakki ridge at B in addition to the central station at Nahakki village to render communication certain with Umra Kalai by night as well as by day.

Water obtained from tank about 400 to 500 yards north-east of village.

No bearings taken from village itself, but this village lies very nearly due north of Nahakki village, distance 5 miles.

### Yakh Dand.

*Signal Station (Y. D.).*—A temporary station was formed on bank of tank close to village on south side whence bearing to station (B) on Nahakki ridge was 172°, distance 7 miles.

Nahakki village itself is obscured by intervening hills.

This station was occupied while the brigade completed the destruction of crops, buildings, etc., required.

### Darwazagai Ridge.

Signal stations with piquets were necessary on this ridge to connect column moving west along the valley from Umra Kalai and Yakh Dand towards Habibzai.

### Habibzai Camp.

No communication obtained with Nahakki village or ridge from within perimeter of this camp, as the Darwazagai range shut out station (B) (on Nahakki ridge) which latter had been occupied during the day.

Communication with station (A) on Nahakki ridge from within perimeter of camp probable by day, but night work not feasible owing to distance of station (A) from Nahakki village and active hostility of district.

### Lakarai Camp.

During the preliminary stages of the attack from southward on the ridges and spurs closing the Lakarai defile, the east end of a low rocky ridge (Signal Station marked L on map) almost due east of Bagh village and immediately west of the Nahakki-Nawagai road and of a large water tank about 300 yards or so away, was occupied for between 4 and 5 hours and communication maintained with station (B) on Nahakki ridge, the bearing of which was 154°, distance 11½ miles. The light of the helio. of this latter station (B) was just visible over west shoulder of ridge lying to the east of the Darwazagai Pass.

Moving northwards through the defile, the village of Lakarai, lying just north of a large tank at the foot of the northern slopes of a very high ridge, is reached. This ridge, to the east of the defile, completely hides the Nahakki ridge, with which, therefore, communication could not be established from within the perimeter of the camp formed round the village.

*Signal Station (M).*—This was formed on a small mound marked (M) on map on right bank of *nala* about ¼ mile south-west of camp and almost due west of the tank, and communication opened for a short time with station (B) on Nahakki ridge bearing, as before, 154°, distance 12½ miles.

Since Nawagai village some 5 or 6 miles up the broad valley to the northwards, and the hills immediately behind and above it to east and west of the pass of that name, can be seen from the roofs of the houses in Lakarai village, and the Nahakki ridge is visible from the low ground (point M) already indicated, there is no object in establishing a Signal Station on the top of the heights to east or west of the Lakarai defile in order to connect Nawagai with Nahakki. A Signal Station in a camp formed in the plain immediately to south of Nawagai village would be visible from roofs of Lakarai village and

a position near or a little to north of M. could no doubt be found for a transmitting station to connect such camp with Nahakki ridge direct without having to ascend the neighbouring heights.

### Shato Khel Camp

The heights to the south of the necessarily scattered camp formed near this place take a horse-shoe formation, the Shatai Pass lying near the centre of the semicircle, but they are at no point sufficiently close to the camp to render piquets necessary. Unless therefore the heights be seized communication with Nahakki is impossible. The high rocky hill-top on north side of *nala* being piquetted, was tried as a signal station [marked (N) on map], but found impracticable owing to the heights to the south obstructing the view. A solitary peak of the Nahakki ridge was seen through an opening in the ridge to the south, but could not be identified more definitely. From this hill-top communication was sought to be obtained with a party of signallers near Hazarnao Mountain in the Malakand range which it was thought might be visible from here, but without success.

### Water obtainable from tanks.

### Had Camp.

The column, continuing its march eastwards along the Pipal valley, sent a flanking party to crown the difficult heights to the southward close to the junction of the Pipal with the Ambahar streams near Kargha. The signalling officer of this party got touch with Nahakki *village* from this point (marked W. R. on map), the bearing from which he made  $208^{\circ}$ , and maintained communication with Divisional Headquarters first just west of Kargha at (O) on map and subsequently at Had camp [marked (P) on map] until obliged to withdraw to camp at the latter place in the evening.

The neighbouring hills were of such great height and so distant from camp at Had that further communication with Nahakki was impossible.

Communication with party near Hazarnao Mountain again attempted unsuccessfully.

### Water obtainable from stream and tank near isolated house.

### Kota Taraf Pass.

This pass lies between the Ambahar and Danish Kol valleys.

*Signal Station (Q).*—Established on high point between 15 and 20 minutes' climb up ridge to west of track over the *kotal*, with a view to opening communication with Nahakki ridge or Hazarnao Mountain, but found this impossible as regards Nahakki ridge owing to intervening hills obstructing the view.

### Mulla Kalai.

The highest point marked (R) on map on right bank of river opposite camp was tried, but though the western portion of the Nahakki range,

probably Khazana hill, was visible, the rest of the ridge was shut out by an intervening range.

Communication with Hazarnao Mountain which should surely be visible from this point was also tried unsuccessfully.

Communication with Nahakki was not re-established until the column issued from the *nala* a mile or two to the east of Umra Kalai at (K) on map.

M. G. HEATH, *Captain*,

*Divl. Signalling Officer*,

*Mohmand Field Force.*

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APPENDIX VII.

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION DURING OPERATIONS.

Battery, Regiment or Detachment.	DURING OPERATIONS.									
	Rounds of ammunition expended.									
	Artillery ammunition.						.303"	Machine Guns, .303" Calibre,	.303 Carbine.	Pistol.
	No. of guns or rifles engaged in each battery or corps.	Shrapnel shell.	Common shell.	Case shot	Star shell.	King shell.				
1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment	430	..	..	..	..	..	19,412	20	..	..
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	867	..	..	..	..	..	24,208	1,010	..	..
22nd Punjabis	688	..	..	..	..	..	32,720	302	..	4
53rd Sikhs, F. F.	729	..	..	..	..	..	55,720	3,571	..	..
57th Wilde's Rifles, F. F.	705	..	..	..	..	..	62,046	954	..	112
59th Scinde Rifles, F. F.	743	..	..	..	..	..	39,461	3,757	..	..
21st Cavalry, F. F.	429	..	..	..	..	..	30,137	..	..	255
19th Lancers	334	..	..	..	..	..	3,323	..	..	4
No. 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners	166	..	..	..	..	..	5,936	..	..	..
No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery	..	795	..	..	50	..	845	..	..	623
80th Battery, Royal Field Artillery	..	449	..	..	..	..	449	..	..	12
22nd Mountain Battery	..	67	..	..	..	..	67	..	..	..
1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	782	..	..	..	..	..	10,709	..	..	301
23rd Mountain Battery	..	577	..	..	3	..	580	..	..	5
No. 1 Company, Sappers and Miners	161	..	..	..	..	..	91	..	..	..
Guides Infantry	728	..	..	..	..	..	18,905	557	..	..
28th Punjabis	666	..	..	..	..	..	12,477	1,671	..	..
34th Sikh Pioneers	721	..	..	..	..	..	11,669	..	..	111
54th Sikhs, F. F.	757	..	..	..	..	..	33,985	4,380	..	8
55th Coke's Rifles, F. F.	670	..	..	..	..	..	29,216	1,928	..	..
18th Battery, Royal Field Artillery	48	217	..	..	..	..	217	39	..	2
28th Mountain Battery	..	455	9	..	24	..	488	..	..	30
1st Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment	787	..	..	..	..	..	238	..	..	..
1st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers	833	..	..	..	..	..	16,389	500	..	336
21st Punjabis	738	..	..	..	..	..	8,793	625	..	..
40th Pathans	719	..	..	..	..	..	16,800	457	..	..
19th Punjabis	702	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Taken by deserters	..	..	..	..	..	..	500	..	..	..
Lost	..	..	..	..	..	..	18	..	..	..
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,403</b>	<b>2,560</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>2,646</b>	<b>437,882</b>	<b>19,726</b>	<b>670</b>
										<b>1,344</b>

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